

The TR Problem in Canada-US Relations

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Abstract

Theodore Roosevelt is regarded less favourably by most Canadians than almost any other American President, especially his distant cousin Franklin D. Roosevelt. This is partly because of the Alaskan Boundary dispute of 1903 when TR is believed to have bullied Britain into conceding the just claims of Canada to the Alaskan panhandle.

In fact, this commonly-held perception is based upon a national myth that overlooks the fact that the Canadian case in 1903 was very weak in law. It also ignores Theodore Roosevelt's later career when he was anything but anti-Canadian—for example, urging American intervention in the Great War on the side of Canada (and Britain).

Introduction

In the lore on Canadian-American diplomatic relations, the part played by individual Presidents looms as a central element, and this notwithstanding that legions of specialists in foreign policy will warn against vesting too much “agency” into the person, or the role, of a single decision-maker. Instead, they say, it is important always to remember that states have enduring “national” interests, the articulation and defence of which necessarily results from a variety of intermingled systemic, cultural, and individual factors. These interests, precisely because they are national, far transcend the preferences and perhaps even the comprehension of individuals, no matter what their role may be; in short, “context” more than anything else, and certainly more than individual predilections or personalities, must figure centrally in the analysis of bilateral relations—even and especially when the relationship under examination is that between Canada and the United States.¹

Those familiar with Kenneth Waltz's three "images" in international political analysis will recognize their unspoken presence in the paragraph above, for together they supply the missing context. Cultural variables come into the picture primarily at the societal level (the "second image"); considerations of relative capability enter at the systemic level ("third image"); and leadership testifies to the importance of the individual as an agent ("first image").² Notwithstanding the good sense implicit in the enjoiner that we refrain from overly personalising diplomatic relations, I am going in this article to concentrate deliberately upon personalities. Employing the Waltzian first-image, I will set out to examine the manner in which Canadians have tended to regard one particular occupant of the White House, Theodore Roosevelt, whose term covered the years 1901–09, a period that saw America's rise to great power status as well as one that featured a particularly nasty moment in Canadian-American relations, occasioned by a boundary dispute in the strip of southeastern Alaska that is called the "Panhandle." Because of that dispute and the manner in which Canadians, both at the time and ever since, have interpreted it, Theodore Roosevelt occupies a place in their national historical consciousness that tells us less about the reality of his diplomacy toward Canada than it does about the socio-psychology of the Canadian-American relationship. In a real sense, we can speak of a "TR problem" in bilateral relations, and it will be my task in these pages to explain exactly what this means.

For sure, there are different ways to adopt a first-image approach in the study of Canada-US relations. One way of framing the argument could be to conceptualize the President as the personifier of a role, or an office. Doing this would oblige us to focus *inter alia* upon the relationship between the executive and other branches of government (the Congress in particular); another could be to shine the spotlight on bureaucratic rivalries and tensions *within* the executive branch itself. Determining who actually "makes" foreign policy, even in the office of the executive, is far from an easy thing to do, given the plethora of departmental entities that find themselves constantly negotiating the very understanding of the national interest, as it will eventually get decreed by the Chief Executive.³ Throw in the Congress, and matters become even murkier, as there have been many occasions in American history upon which it was apparent that policy was getting made (or not made, as the case may be) more effectively *outside* the executive branch than within it.

My own method of approaching matters in these pages is predicated upon a conviction that we really can speak of an institution known as the "Imperial Presidency." Thus I will suspend, at least for the years I cover in this article,

that old and never dying interrogation as to who actually is dominant in policymaking, Congress or the Executive. I am fully aware that the Executive does not always dominate, and may not even typically dominate, but during the first decade of the twentieth century, America did experience clear (though hardly uncontested) executive supremacy over foreign policy.⁴ Therefore it is upon the personality, perceptions, and behaviour of Theodore Roosevelt that I focus my attention, in a bid to determine just what it was about his Presidency that has left such a negative impression upon Canadians, down to the present time.

Good Roosevelt, Bad Roosevelt

American Presidents have never, as a rule, proved easy for Canadians to love. Though there have been notable exceptions to this rule, Canadians have nursed a general sense of having been “bullied” by US Chief Executives for as long as anyone can remember.⁵ This is a trend that has, if anything, regained currency of late, with George W. Bush being held by Canadians in lower esteem than any of his predecessors—with the possible exception of James Madison, who occupied the White House the last time Canadians and Americans warred against each other.⁶ Indeed, so fixated have they become upon the current incumbent that public-opinion surveyors even deem it worthwhile to ask Canadians whether they think their Prime Minister, Stephen Harper, “will do whatever George Bush wants him to.”⁷

But there is another side to this national obsession with their superpower neighbour’s Chief Executives, for at the opposite end of the affective scale one finds a handful of Presidents who were really quite popular with Canadians—at times even more popular than their own Prime Ministers. Among those well-liked Presidents, one stands head and shoulders above the rest. This is the “good” Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, whose long tenure in office (1933–45) is regarded as a shining exception to the trend of Chief Executives thought by Canadians either to be too hard on them or, worse yet, to be ignoring them altogether. As Lawrence Martin has put it so succinctly, “FDR was a gem for Canada.”⁸ However, when they turn their minds to one of FDR’s predecessors, his fifth cousin Theodore, Canadians recall a President who fit a different mould, that of a “bully,” and fit it so well that he could have been mistaken for having invented it. In stark contrast with Franklin Delano, the good Roosevelt of the Good Neighbour policy,⁹ is Theodore, the bad Roosevelt of the “Big Stick”. In fact, the Canadian interpretation of Theodore Roosevelt is deeply flawed, and his reputation north of the border is undeserved, because

the differences between the two Roosevelts' regard for, and policies toward, Canada are less pronounced than is commonly believed.

It takes nothing away from the reputation of FDR, who with reason is recalled so fondly by Canadians, to claim that TR has been drastically misunderstood in Canada, where, unlike in the United States, there has been a relatively invariant, and negative, collective assessment of the twenty-sixth President's merit. It is true that even in the United States, TR's reputation as a diplomatist had varied over time, but for the past few decades it has been on a decidedly upward trajectory, such that he is now widely regarded as having possessed one of the steadiest pairs of hands ever placed on the tiller of the ship of state. The revival of enthusiasm for Theodore Roosevelt dates from the Second World War, and had become especially pronounced by the time of the Reagan Administration; ever since, scholars and policymakers alike have tended to wax enthusiastic when contemplating TR's significance for the national interest.¹⁰

This resuscitation followed a period of eclipse during the interwar years, a time when exuberance in foreign policy—especially exuberant interventionism—was being frowned upon by an American public and political leadership smitten with the charms of noninterventionism (not to say isolationism), and a time when a revisionist biographical trend was dominating the historiography of the Roosevelt record.¹¹ Yet among students of Canada-US relations, especially in Canada, it is as if the revisionist trend is still alive, for in Canada there remains a lingering dissatisfaction with the Roosevelt legacy, and this largely because of the image of him as an aggressive nationalist who pushed around a defenceless Canada over a portion of territory that many Canadians, then and now, assumed belonged by right to them.

Symbolic Alaska

For Canadians, the manner in which the Alaskan boundary was settled in 1903 is in many respects of far greater significance than the immediate stakes—i.e., the terrain—that had triggered the quarrel in the first place. After all, the two North American neighbours are each so generously endowed with territory that it is difficult to see, at the remove of a century, why so much emotion could have been aroused over such a relatively tiny strip of real estate as that at the centre of contention in the Panhandle. It is not that the land in question was unimportant to Canada at the turn of the last century (it was important, at least for a short while); rather, it is that in the national historical consciousness the dispute has come to possess a symbolic importance that dwarfs whatever

significance the territory itself may once have possessed. For what Alaska represents, and by extension what the Theodore Roosevelt problem can be said to encapsulate, is a fear that Canada at the best of times sleeps with one eye open, looking towards an aggressive and “unilateral” neighbour prepared, when the moment is ripe, to pounce in such a manner as to do grave damage to her interests.¹²

Canadians, then and now, have subscribed to the view that the US “shafted” them on the Panhandle issue, and that—even worse—the British were complicit in the crime, effectively “sacrificing” Canadian interests and territory to the cause of closer Anglo-American understanding. In Canadian political mythology, which habitually casts the country in the role of survivor (if not of victim), Alaska provides that most poignant of moments, the time when noble little Canada was done in by *two* bullies.

There is another way to conceptualize things. In international relations terminology, as opposed to national mythologizing, the controversy is sometimes less emotionally contextualized as representing just another instance of an age-old dilemma within alliances, whereby the smaller state (in our case, Canada) fears being abandoned by its larger protector (Britain), because that protector worries about being entrapped in a war as a result of its obligation to safeguard its ally. More than three decades ago, one British analyst explicitly likened what had occurred in respect of Alaska to the troubles then afflicting NATO, as a result of differences over the wisdom of *détente* with the Soviet Union: “In the hostage country, Canada, there was a running debate—about the credibility of its guarantor, about whether its own interests might be sacrificed in the process of *détente* that followed the Civil War—analogue in many ways to what we have witnessed in Western Europe in the 1970s.”¹³

Though the analogy may be telling in respect of a structural dilemma inherent in alliances, it is silent on the merits of this particular dispute, as well as on the perceptions and personalities of the key actors in the drama. For, *pace* the conventional wisdom, TR did not act particularly “aggressively” in respect of the territorial settlement, nor was his diplomacy in the matter characterized by “unilateralism.” In short, Alaska does not symbolize what it is supposed to, and to understand this apparent contradiction with the historical record, let us turn to that record.

The Merits of the Issue

In large measure, TR's stance on Alaska is represented by Canadians as unreasonable, with a basis in neither international law nor geopolitical need. In fact, the opposite is far closer to the truth, for it was Roosevelt rather than his Canadian counterpart, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, who was operating with the backing of international law. Moreover it was Laurier, far more than Roosevelt, whose behaviour might be said to have been inspired by ideological commitment—in his case, to the idea that among liberal democracies who find themselves in dispute, all issues can be resolved via peaceful compromise, so that Ottawa effectively could say to Washington, “what’s mine is mine, what’s yours is negotiable,” and expect Washington to play along. Compared with Laurier, whose belief that Canada could get what it was seeking merely by asking for it, the American leader appeared to be the model of pragmatism, and certainly of realism.

What Laurier wanted was to transform the boundary regime in such a way as to benefit Canadian economic interests. Superficially, there was not too much in Ottawa's desire that smacked of lunacy; after all, most observers at the time who knew anything about the Alaska-Yukon boundary line would have agreed that its exact contours remained a matter of some indeterminacy. Specifically, what Ottawa sought, following the August 1896 discovery of gold by the prospector, George Washington Carmack, on Bonanza Creek, was direct access from the Klondike to the Pacific Ocean. This meant obtaining from the United States Dyea, Skagway, and Pyramid Harbor, all at the head of the Lynn Canal, which if possessed by Canada, would provide that outlet to salt water.

But what looked to Ottawa as a fairly trivial, and eminently reasonable, request being made of a fellow liberal democracy appeared to Roosevelt as anything but. There was, as the latter saw matters, a large legal principle at stake: the “claim of the Canadians for access to deep water along any part of the Canadian coast is just exactly as indefensible as if they should now suddenly claim the island of Nantucket.”¹⁴ It may be true that the particular contours of the boundary line were open to dispute, but from Roosevelt's point of view there was one overriding principle, namely that the US had the right to an *unbroken littoral* running from Alaska proper down to the southern tip of the Panhandle. And in this position, the US had the strong backing of international law. For the principle of the uninterrupted littoral had been established and recognized back in 1825, when the British and the Russians drew the line separating their territorial holdings in northwest North America. And it was this territorial settlement that governed the purchase by the US from Russia in

1867; no one disputed it at the time (though there always was some uncertainty about the exact limits of the boundary, including in the *Portland Canal*, at the Panhandle's southern tip). Until the gold rush, the unbroken littoral was not a bone of contention.¹⁵ Notwithstanding the established legal status of this principle, Laurier—some say because of his ideological conviction that liberal democracies invariably would seek and find compromise solutions to diplomatic problems—expected not only that the United States would abandon the unbroken littoral but that the United Kingdom, which had agreed to it in the first place, would provide the necessary support to “entice” the Americans into making the compromise Laurier was counting on, and thought Canada deserved.

He was wrong on all counts, and the dénouement of the dispute was to contribute greatly to a sharp—albeit temporary—deterioration in Canadian relations not only with the Americans, but with the British as well. It was the manner in which Roosevelt chose to react that would do the most to establish his image in the Canadian national consciousness, for it is believed in respect of Alaska that not only was Canada in the right (it was not), but that the American President was willing to use military force to back up the US claim (he said he would).

Roosevelt did agree that an international commission should be established to resolve the controversy, but he at no time regarded the role of this body to be that of arbitrator of the principle that lay at the heart of the quarrel. Instead, he saw the role of the commission to be a means of helping arrange a diplomatic climb-down for Canada, with British (and tacit American) support. In Canada, the perception was vastly different—of an American President clearly intent upon playing the part of scofflaw by making a public mockery of the very process that Canadians regarded as essential to resolving the dispute. There is, on this point of style rather than of substance, validity to the Canadian claim, for although the six commissioners chosen (three from the US, three from Canada/Britain) were supposed to be “impartial jurists of repute,” few of them could fit the description. In the case of the American delegation, the gap separating personalities from impartiality was particularly glaring, with two members, ex-Senator George Turner of Washington and Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts, being well known for their hostility either to Canada (Turner) or to Britain (Lodge); both had publicly declared themselves opposed to any compromise even before the talks had begun. The third American member, Secretary of War Elihu Root, was, comparatively speaking, a model of impartiality.

Things were not much different on the other side. Canada placed two members on the commission who were just as *parti pris* as the two American senators. They were Sir Louis-Amable Jetté, Lieutenant Governor of Québec, and A. B. Aylesworth, soon to become Federal Justice Minister. Each was as committed to the Canadian claim as the Americans were to theirs. The third member of the British/Canadian team, and in retrospect the only one on either side who could truly be said to be impartial, was Lord Alverstone, Lord Chief Justice of England. Alverstone sided with the American contention about the inviolability of the unbroken littoral, but was instrumental in Canada's obtaining a favourable adjustment of the border elsewhere in the Panhandle.

This latter has hardly been noticed by Canadians, who at the time and ever since have been convinced Alverstone acted as Judas Escariot, selling out Canada not for financial but for geopolitical gain, to wit the desire to facilitate Britain's *rapprochement* with the United States. Sometimes Alverstone appears, in the Canadian historical consciousness, to be even more of a villain than Roosevelt. In reality, neither man could objectively be said to have acted in a villainous manner; nor were their stances profoundly detrimental to Canada's interests, unless those interests be construed in such a manner as to equate the frustration of Canadian desire with the flouting of morality and commonsense.

In the case of Roosevelt, what hardly anyone in Canada recalls about his Administration is that *for the first time in American history* a President would preside over his country's territorial shrinkage. Despite having the reputation of a committed imperialist and rabid expansionist, Theodore Roosevelt in early 1909 turned over to his successor, William Howard Taft, an America that was actually smaller than the one he had inherited in September 1901, upon assuming the Presidency following the assassination of William McKinley. This was entirely due to his conceding to Canada territory in Alaska that had previously been held by the US. In Alaska, Roosevelt abandoned a claim to territory larger than the state of Rhode Island, or more than 600 square miles; the territorial cession consisted in two islands in the Portland Canal (Wales and Pearse), plus a bit of the fringe of the Panhandle itself. This cession exceeded the square mileage added through the acquisition of the Panama Canal Zone, also during his Administration.¹⁶

But so durable has the sacrifice myth proved, that when the Roosevelt years were over, to be followed by a "slate-cleaning"¹⁷ era associated with the Presidency of the likeable Taft, Canadians breathed a sigh of collective relief—a sigh that continues to be audible down to the present, and this even though

Roosevelt himself would later, while out of office, show himself to be an enthusiastic proponent of causes that Canada (English Canada, at least) held most dear.

TR and the Question of “Unilateralism”

It is to this latter point, Roosevelt’s identification with causes that Canadians themselves held dear, that I now turn. The image of TR in Canada is, as I have argued so far, in large measure a function of the misreading of Alaska. But there is something else that comes to Canadian minds when they recall the Presidency of Theodore Roosevelt: his alleged proclivity toward “unilateralism.” Since the conviction is ingrained in the national psyche that Canada sits with the angels on the side not only of righteousness but of “multilateralism,” it must follow that any President tarred with the brush of unilateralism could not have been a very Canada-friendly Chief Executive. So let us ask whether Roosevelt could in any meaningful sense be regarded as “anti-Canadian,” and this because he was supposedly a unilateralist. There are two components to this interrogation. I start with the first, and ask whether Roosevelt was anti-Canadian.

Theodore Roosevelt as a young man shared the convictions held by many of his compatriots when it came to the so-called “Manifest Destiny” of the United States to preside over the fortunes of a large swath of North America, if not of the entire Western Hemisphere. That is to say that the young Roosevelt accepted as only proper that some day, through the natural workings of “political gravitation,” the new Canadian state would be absorbed into the great Republic. Expansionists of an earlier age might have been tempted to rush the course of events, but by the latter quarter of the nineteenth century, Americans were prepared, by and large, to wait, many of them firm in their belief that “Providence” would ultimately reward their patience. In the case of Roosevelt, the impetus to expansionism was bolstered by the conviction that Darwinian science conditioned states to engage in constant competition, with the ultimate stakes being the survival of those whom the nature of world politics deemed the fittest.

Roosevelt was not particularly religious in the manner of so many contemporary American Presidents or Presidential aspirants, and he took his cues on expansion much more from science than from Providence.¹⁸ Nevertheless, he did share in the widespread view that there was something more than a bit unnatural about the existence of Canada outside of the territorial confines of the US, and until such time as geopolitical events conspired to make him an

unabashed admirer of Great Britain,¹⁹ he had been known on occasion to muse about the desirability of acquiring Canada, either as retaliation against some perceived British injustice (as in the Venezuelan boundary crisis of 1895),²⁰ or simply because it seemed to be the logical thing to do. During McKinley's first Administration (1897–1901), Roosevelt angered the President's principal political supporter and close friend, Ohio's Mark Hannah, by complaining about the lack of martial zeal being evinced by the Chief Executive. Hearing Roosevelt remark that a war with Britain might do some good, by ejecting it from North America, the Ohio senator retorted, "You're crazy, Roosevelt! What's wrong with Canada?"²¹

The answer, it would turn out, was nothing. Over time, Roosevelt grew to be quite fond of Canada, and came to regard Canadians' eagerness to cock a snook at the US as a sign of spirit and good character, something that reminded him very much of Americans' own earlier relish in twisting the tail of the British lion. Partly because of this new-found appreciation of Canadian virtues (itself a function of Roosevelt's reassessment of Britain's merits after 1898), Roosevelt wanted to concede something to Canada (and Britain) in the Alaskan business, which he did. And slightly more than a decade later, he would show himself to be someone who was anything *but* anti-Canadian, first by urging early American intervention in the Great War on Canada's (and Britain's) side and then, for a time, contemplating raising and leading a division of soldiers into combat on the Western front under *Canadian* colours.²²

What of the claim that he was emphatically a "unilateralist"? Here, too, the evidence is mixed, but on balance, if one takes his diplomatic style as guide, it is obvious that Roosevelt exercised a preference for negotiation and consultation with other great powers that bears all the hallmarks of multilateralism.²³ His years in office were characterized by an ongoing, shrewd, and skilful application of a battery of diplomatic talents with hardly any resemblance to unilateralism as the latter has come to be understood in recent years. Moreover, with one foreign state in particular, Great Britain, Roosevelt even developed an understanding for which the label "transnationalism" might not be out of place.

Some historians have chosen to characterize his statecraft as fundamentally the product of a "tense nationalism" born of a tenacious pride in country and alertness to any challenge to the country's honour or interests.²⁴ Yet there was another side to Roosevelt, one that betrayed a budding sense of what would come, by social scientists, to be called "collective identity,"²⁵ and this side stands in sharp contrast to the caricature of him—and not just in the Canadian

collective imagination—as the ultimate exponent of *Realpolitik* in international relations.²⁶

Conclusion

Far from being a strident unilateralist prepared to trample upon Canadian interests in the Alaska affair, Theodore Roosevelt demonstrated a different kind of stridency, the product more of *bilateralism* than of unilateralism. The only problem, for Canada, was that the object of Roosevelt's transnational affection at the time was Britain more than Canada. And if there is anything to the claim, as the Canadian national myth holds it, of having been "sacrificed" over Alaska, it owes much more to transnationalism and bilateralism than it does to nationalism and unilateralism.

It is not too far-fetched to remark a budding sense of transoceanic collective identity—what social scientists have come to call a "we-feeling"—characterizing Anglo-American relations during Theodore Roosevelt's Presidency. In time, this "we-feeling" would expand to include its ostensible "victim" in Alaska, as Canada began to establish a more autonomous identity within an emerging North Atlantic Triangle. Significantly, the process would begin not *after* the Roosevelt Administration, but rather during it, in 1907, when for the first time a Canadian official would actively begin to play the role of "linchpin" between America and Britain.

Thus the TR "problem" in Canadian-American relations boils down to a problem of fundamental misperception. Franklin D. Roosevelt no doubt deserves to be recalled sympathetically by Canadians, but Theodore Roosevelt hardly warrants their opprobrium. There is a final irony here, for the official alluded to in the paragraph above was none other than William Lyon Mackenzie King, who would later be celebrated as the Prime Minister who did so much during the global upheavals of the 1930s and 1940s to cement the image of FDR as the "good Roosevelt" in Canadian consciousness. Much less well known, in Canada and elsewhere, is that King, while serving as Deputy Minister of Labour and Immigration in the Laurier Government, worked actively to try to secure British support for both Canada *and the US* as they grappled with the impact of rising levels of Japanese immigration on the North American west coast. So not only can we date the "slate-cleaning" era from the Presidency of Theodore Roosevelt and not William Howard Taft, but the Roosevelt years also witnessed the first instance of a Canadian "bridging" propensity within the North Atlantic Triangle.²⁷

Endnotes

- ¹ Kim Richard Nossal, "Defense Policy and the Atmospherics of Canada-U.S. Relations: The Case of the Harper Conservatives," *American Review of Canadian Studies* 37 (Spring 2007): 23–34.
- ² Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954).
- ³ See Roger Hilsman, *The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs: Conceptual Models and Bureaucratic Politics*, 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1990).
- ⁴ See Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Imperial Presidency* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973); and Fareed Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).
- ⁵ Lawrence Martin, *The Presidents and the Prime Ministers: Washington and Ottawa Face to Face—The Myth of Bilateral Bliss, 1867–1982* (Markham, ONT: PaperJacks, 1983).
- ⁶ Michael Adams, "Bash Thy Neighbour," *Globe and Mail* (Toronto), 19 October 2005, p. A21.
- ⁷ A question to which more than half (53 percent) responded in the affirmative in a poll conducted by the Strategic Counsel in late August 2007; see Gloria Galloway, "The Harper Paradox," *Globe and Mail*, 28 August 2007, pp. A1, A9.
- ⁸ Martin, *Presidents and Prime Ministers*, p. 8.
- ⁹ For a good study of Canada-US relations during the FDR years, see Galen Roger Perras, *Franklin Roosevelt and the Origins of the Canadian-American Security Alliance, 1933–1945: Necessary but not Necessary Enough* (Westport: Praeger, 1999).
- ¹⁰ See Charles R. Kesler, "Bearish on Teddy," *National Interest*, no. 52 (Summer 1998), pp. 105-9; William N. Tilchin, *Theodore Roosevelt and the British Empire: A Study in Presidential Statecraft* (New York: St. Martin's, 1997), pp. ix–xi; and Serge Ricard, *Théodore Roosevelt: Principes et pratique d'une politique étrangère* (Aix-en-Provence: Publications de l'Université de Provence, 1991), pp. 12–24.
- ¹¹ The revisionism of this period was heavily influenced by one widely read life of the twenty-sixth President, Henry F. Pringle, *Theodore Roosevelt: A Biography* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1956; orig. pub. 1931).
- ¹² Though an American himself, one writer's assessment of Roosevelt's Alaska diplomacy neatly sums up the standard Canadian historiography;

- see Thomas A. Bailey, "Theodore Roosevelt and the Alaskan Boundary Settlement," *Canadian Historical Review* 18 (June 1937): 123–30.
- ¹³ Alastair Buchan, "Mothers and Daughters (or Greeks and Romans)," *Foreign Affairs* 54 (April 1976): 648.
- ¹⁴ In a letter of July 1903 to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Oliver Wendell Holmes; quoted in Tilchin, *Roosevelt and the British Empire*, p. 43. Nantucket lies off the southeastern coast of Massachusetts, of which state it forms a part. A year earlier, the President had complained to his Secretary of State, John Hay, about the Canadians' having submitted a "wholly false claim . . . in a spirit of bumptious truculence." He added that "if trouble comes it will be purely because of their own fault; and although it would not be pleasant for us it would be death for them." Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 38.
- ¹⁵ The best study of the dispute remains Norman Penlington, *The Alaska Boundary Dispute: A Critical Reappraisal* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1972).
- ¹⁶ See Frederick W. Marks, III, *Velvet on Iron: The Diplomacy of Theodore Roosevelt* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1979), p. 34.
- ¹⁷ For this imagery, see J. L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or for Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s* (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1991), pp. 35–36.
- ¹⁸ See John Morton Blum, *The Republican Roosevelt* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 26.
- ¹⁹ Most observers accept 1898 as the *annus mirabilis* in Anglo-American relations, as a result of Britain's strong backing of the Americans during the war with Spain. See Geoffrey Seed, "British Reactions to American Imperialism Reflected in Journals of Opinion, 1898–1900," *Political Science Quarterly* 73 (June 1958): 254–72.
- ²⁰ At the time of that dispute, over the boundary between Venezuela and British Guiana, Roosevelt was inclined to want the US to go to war. William James remarked that he was then in his "Sturm und Drang" period, one in which any foe, Britain included, would do. Quoted in William Henry Harbaugh, *Power and Responsibility: The Life and Times of Theodore Roosevelt* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1961), pp. 97–98.
- ²¹ Quoted in H. W. Brands, *T.R.: The Last Romantic* (New York: Basic Books, 1997), p. 395.
- ²² Roosevelt's energetic, indeed impassioned, advocacy of American intervention in the First World War followed the sinking of the *Lusitania* in 1915. See Brands, *T.R.*, p. 778; and Peter Collier, with David Horowitz,

- The Roosevelts: An American Saga* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), pp. 188–89.
- ²³ Raymond A. Esthus, *Theodore Roosevelt and the International Rivalries* (Waltham, MA: Ginn-Blaisdell, 1970).
- ²⁴ Howard K. Beale, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power* (New York: Collier, 1962; orig. pub. 1956), pp. 38–39.
- ²⁵ On this concept, borrowed by students of international relations from the sociologists, see Samuel Noah Eisenstadt and Bernhard Giesen, “The Construction of Collective Identity,” *European Journal of Sociology* 36 (1995): 72–102.
- ²⁶ For a useful corrective of that caricature, see Greg Russell, “Theodore Roosevelt, Geopolitics, and Cosmopolitan Ideals,” *Review of International Studies* 32 (July 2006): 541–59.
- ²⁷ King-Roosevelt interaction is detailed in Tilchin, *Roosevelt and the British Empire*, pp. 173–76.