

## Neville Chamberlain, Appeasement and the Role of the British Dominions

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### Abstract

This article examines the role of the British Dominions in the shaping of the policy of appeasement as pursued by the British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain toward Nazi Germany in September 1938. How much influence, it might be asked, did the self-governing British Dominions have, especially in the period leading up to Munich? The implications of British foreign policy *vis-à-vis* the Empire, which is in large measure an extension of domestic policy, meant different things. In one sense the Dominions were prepared to accept the policy of Britain as the policy of the Empire; the question was how far it would extend to the Dominions. In the sphere of imperial relations the First World War marked the advance of the Dominions in regards to their sovereignty status. The idea of a centralized imperial structure was abandoned. The right to declare war or to remain neutral rested solely with the respective Dominion Governments. In the process of historical development peace-time relations within the Commonwealth had been worked out by combining ‘flexibility with continuity’, but they had not worked out a solution of war-time relations. Yet, Britain’s contingency plan depended on the assumption of Dominion support.<sup>1</sup> The Dominions sought to preserve Empire unity but they held divergent views on ‘Imperial centralization’ and imperial commitments.<sup>2</sup> To the outside observer it might have seemed paradoxical that, at the time when the world was in chaos and Great Britain was seeking to establish a common imperial foreign and defence policy, the Dominions would not make any military arrangements with Britain. Had the Dominions co-ordinated their defence policies as early as 1936–37, they would have been better equipped when war broke out.

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The policy of appeasement is the subject of much reappraisal; yet, there is no satisfactory examination of the significant role that the self-governing British Dominions played in the appeasement of the dictators. The advent of the seventieth anniversary of Munich, presents an opportunity to revisit the critical

historical judgment of Neville Chamberlain and to discuss the role of the Dominions in the formulation of the policy of appeasement. It is not required to accept at face value, as a single reason, that Chamberlain entertained Dominion response as the sole cause to placate the dictators, but records do suggest that the response of the Dominions to British foreign policy is another element in the many factors that influenced the policy of appeasement. In respect to this element, and the divergent interpretations of the roots and causes of the policy of appeasement, scholars have neglected to survey fully the pressures that the Dominions, especially Canada, placed on the British Government not to trigger a conflict that might draw them into an unnecessary war. In this complex debate and evaluation of the policy of appeasement, the unarguable point is that until Adolf Hitler attacked Russia in June 1941, the Dominions were the primary suppliers of men and equipment to the Allied war effort and Canada was the strongest contributor.<sup>3</sup> If we consider this fact, then the Dominions were essential to British strength. Even the French Government looked to the Dominions to provide forces to France.<sup>4</sup> During the Second World War the Dominions made capital contributions to the allied forces. Particularly, Canada became the 'atomic broker' in the Anglo-American atom bomb project.<sup>5</sup>

Whilst some historians have recognized the reluctance of the British Dominions to agree to an imperial foreign policy, discussion on the extent the Dominions influenced British diplomatic policy is limited.<sup>6</sup> At the Imperial Conference of 1937, the Dominion Prime Ministers supported the policy of appeasement and they stood behind the strategy of Chamberlain to seek an adjustment of German grievances. Whilst Australia and 'the Britain of the South Seas', New Zealand,<sup>7</sup> urged for a united Empire effort in defence, Canada and South Africa sidestepped discussions on imperial affairs and a unified imperial defence policy.<sup>8</sup> The aim, therefore, is to target the discussion to the subject of common imperial defence policy and the response of the Dominions to the policy of appeasement. The appeasement of Nazi Germany failed to safeguard European security; nonetheless, when war broke out, the Dominions stood united in support of Britain.<sup>9</sup>

When one speaks of the relationship between the Dominions and the Mother Country one also needs to focus on the relationship between Dominion and Dominion. Though all the Dominions were committed to promoting peace and prosperity they also had varied interests. The Dominions could not speak for each other without prior consultation. Foreign policies could be worked out by the Foreign Office in London, but it was necessary for His Majesty's Government to consult the autonomous Dominions on matters that would affect their security. Before 1914 Great Britain maintained control of foreign relations,

and in the First World War it declared war on behalf of the Empire as a whole. After the war the Dominions signed treaties with foreign powers, joined the League of Nations, and exercised many of the powers of sovereign states. Respecting this desire for more independent action, the British Parliament, in 1931, passed a momentous act affecting the whole constitutional structure of the British Empire.<sup>10</sup> The Statute of Westminster confirmed Dominion sovereignty, each with freedom in external and domestic affairs. However, the prevailing British attitude to the Dominions was one of superiority.

The Foreign Office, in particular, showed little understanding of the emerging Dominions and this created tensions between London and the Dominion capitals: respectively, Ottawa, Sydney, Wellington and Pretoria.<sup>11</sup> Joe Garner at the Dominions Office remarked that Lord Vansittart, the Permanent Under-Secretary, was 'disinclined to share information with the Dominion capitals.'<sup>12</sup> To avoid the embarrassment of Dominion opposition and to produce mutual understanding leading to a concerted action, Neville Chamberlain, unlike his successor Winston Churchill, who opposed the Statute of Westminster and had little understanding of Dominion relationships,<sup>13</sup> recognized the importance of their co-operation in strategic defence plans.

In May 1937, when Neville Chamberlain moved to No. 10 Downing Street the Dominion leaders—'sans the Irish Free State (best considered a Dominion in name only)'—<sup>14</sup> were already present in London for the Imperial Conference following the Coronation ceremony of King George VI. The Coronation celebrations were an impressive demonstration of imperial solidarity. It was the first time that the forms of the Coronation service made particular reference to the significance of the changes to the new constitutional relationships and Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa were expressly named.<sup>15</sup> Turning to the events of the Imperial Conference, between May and June, the questions of foreign affairs and defence were the subjects of lengthy discussions. In the meeting of the United Committee of Imperial Defence, British officials explained that they were looking for 'uniformity in administration practices in defence matters [and] co-operation in production and supply of munitions and raw materials'.<sup>16</sup> The emphasis the British Chiefs of Staff placed on the form of assistance for the Dominions was on the production of arms and munitions, the provision of an army in the theatre of war, and access to naval bases for repairs and refuelling along the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. Canada, the oldest Dominion, was singled out for the development of the Empire Air Training Scheme, later known as the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan, for the manufacturing of guns, and later for the Manhattan Project.<sup>17</sup> Canada's resources in aluminium and nickel, as well as its position

in the North Atlantic Triangle,<sup>18</sup> made it the most likely Dominion to help in a war effort.<sup>19</sup> It is important to note that Canada led the discussions at the Imperial Conference on questions of imperial policy and defence.<sup>20</sup> W.N. Medlicott indicated that 'in a very real sense, Mr. Mackenzie King was the voice of the new Commonwealth relationships'.<sup>21</sup> In the end, the Conference arrived at only general principles of co-operation in the defence of common interests.

At the Conference the Dominions presented a mixed picture. The South African delegates were not prepared to discuss matters of defence. Mainly, South Africa looked to concentrate its resources on the protection of the African Continent and to avoid controversial debates of neutrality between the two governing nationalities—the Afrikaans and the British.<sup>22</sup> On the other hand, Australia and New Zealand were prepared to accept a unified imperial effort in defence. Both recognized their dependence on Britain for defence in the Pacific and reinforcement of the Singapore naval base. Canada, however, was not interested in the formal machinery of imperial co-operation. As far as the Canadian Prime Minister was concerned, the function of the Conference was primarily 'to exchange information, not to formulate or declare policy'.<sup>23</sup> For Mackenzie King any 'unified Empire policy' was a form of colonialism that would be unacceptable to the nationalist faction in Canada.<sup>24</sup> In any event, the Canadian Premier refused to discuss Australian defence problems even though in a combined European and Asiatic war, Britain would be occupied with local defence leaving Australians to defend themselves unaided against the superior military power of Japan. Throughout the conference members of Canada's Joint Staff Committee, led by Col. H.D.G. Crerar, sidestepped discussions on imperial affairs and a unified imperial defence policy.<sup>25</sup> It is perhaps a fair assumption that the position of the Canadian Government was influenced by the isolationist and fascist element in Quebec.

Neville Chamberlain, Anthony Eden (Foreign Secretary), Sir Thomas Inskip (Minister of Co-ordination and Defence) and the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, Malcolm MacDonald, amongst others had a difficult time trying to balance the divergent points of view, especially when it came time to draft a resolution to the proposed changes of the Covenant of the League of Nations. On 8 June M. J. Savage of New Zealand proposed that 'all Governments represented would base their policies on membership in the League of Nations.' To make Canada's voice heard Mackenzie King informed Chamberlain that the Canadian Government would not adjust its external policy to suit the League.<sup>26</sup> In the following days, Mackenzie King, a fierce critic of collective security, proceeded to outline Canada's position on the League in light of the Abyssinian conflict. He observed that the provisions of the Covenant to reduce arms

had failed 'because of a general unwillingness' to use force against aggression. He insisted that changes be made to Article XI to remove anything that might lead to 'old fashioned military alliances'.<sup>27</sup>

At the sixteenth session Chamberlain, accepting the Canadian view, stated that minority rights should not be overlooked; he said 'that no useful purpose would be served by publishing anything on which Delegations disagreed'.<sup>28</sup> This session left Mackenzie King with deep respect for the British Prime Minister. Chamberlain's action and his personal relations with Mackenzie King later 'paid enormous dividends', wrote C. P. Stacey.<sup>29</sup> At the next session nothing more was done to revise the Covenant. Whilst in London Mackenzie King who, incidentally, the German officials considered to be a man of influence,<sup>30</sup> received an invitation to visit Berlin before returning to Canada from the Imperial Conference. He eagerly grasped the opportunity though not before consulting Chamberlain who advised him to accept the invitation. For the most part, Mackenzie King believed that a private meeting with the German Chancellor, Adolf Hitler, would be an opportunity for him to bring together Britain and Germany into a more friendly relationship. 'I am perfectly certain', he wrote to Lord Tweedsmuir, the Governor General of Canada, 'that the Germans are not contemplating the possibility of war, either with France or with Britain'.<sup>31</sup> Evidently, he misjudged Hitler's intentions in Europe.

The machinery of consultation that evolved did not bind individual members to a particular course of action. The symbol of a common Crown was not enough to determine imperial policy. Whilst no formal commitments were made at the Conference, which in any event had to have the approval of the respective Parliaments, there was unity in fundamental principles. The entire circumstances of the gathering indicate a disposition on the part of the Dominions to promote the 'give-and-take' of politics for peace. The Dominion leaders agreed that 'the Commonwealth's policy is peace and defence, and not war and aggression'. Their position was that differences between nations 'should be sought by methods of co-operation, joint enquiry and conciliation'.<sup>32</sup> In sum, the Dominion Governments, though they agreed to continue to consult and co-operate with one another in the vital interests of common concern, placed a great deal of pressure on Britain to avoid an unnecessary war. To this end they joined Chamberlain in the pursuit of peace 'by every practical means'.<sup>33</sup>

The decade following the First World War was largely a period of employing the trial and error method to discover how to keep peace. The 1919 Treaty of Versailles, the Washington Conference of 1921–22, the 1925 Locarno

Treaties, the Briand-Kellogg Peace Pact of 1928, which outlawed war as a means of settling disputes, and the 1930 London Naval Conference were all attempts to bring peace to the world.<sup>34</sup> Amid deteriorating economic conditions aggravated by the Wall Street stock market crash of 1929, the Italian and German dictatorships used military might in international affairs. Whilst Britain needed an economically sound Germany, France feared its growing power and countries, in general, feared Russian Bolshevism. By the spring of 1938 Germany had destroyed the restrictive clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, discredited the League and made considerable territorial gains. After annexing Austria via the *Anschluss* on 13 March, Adolf Hitler looked to the former Austro-Hungarian territories then known as Czechoslovakia.<sup>35</sup> At the time of the dissolution of Austria-Hungary following its defeat in the First World War the Sudeten-Germans in Czechoslovakia had been denied their right to remain with Austria or to join Germany.<sup>36</sup> Hitler followed up his success in Austria with propaganda against Czechoslovakia. Did Chamberlain have the power to stop such a set of circumstances? Perhaps Chamberlain's position would have been stronger if he could have given an early warning to Hitler that Britain, France and the Dominions were ready to fight.

The events of the September crisis of 1938 and the Munich agreement have been well explored and documented; therefore, we shall avoid describing it in great detail. On the international scene Chamberlain had three main preoccupations: the first was to preserve peace; the second was to achieve a broader understanding with Germany and Italy; the third was to establish effective defence co-ordination with the Dominions in the event of war. The last aim was just as challenging as the previous ones because in 1937–38 there was no single common foreign policy, no agreed defence plan and no Dominion commitment of forces in a theatre of war. Chamberlain, described by British scholar Frank McDonough, as being 'a strong-willed, intelligent and clear-sighted political tactician', had to take into consideration the resources of manpower, naval and anti-aircraft defence, the production capacity of Britain and the Empire.<sup>37</sup> The *Inskip Report* of 1937 exposed the failure of Britain to have parity with the German air force. The implications of the serious inadequacies in Britain's own defence reduced its ability to meet the long-range requirements of home and imperial defence. Chamberlain knew that Britain, with an untrained army and an almost non-existent anti-aircraft defence, was not ready to engage in a major European conflict. The following extract from the House of Commons Debate on 7 March 1938 summarizes his judgment on the situation: 'wars are not only won with arms and men; they are won with reserves of resources and credit'.<sup>38</sup>

At the time of the Munich crisis, Britain had only twenty-nine squadrons of fighters, many of which had outdated guns. The British Cabinet members dreaded a continental commitment for the reason that the regular army was “disorganized” and “untrained”.<sup>39</sup> In 1938, the Dominions were less prepared for war than Britain. In Canada and Australia enlarged defence estimates were quoted for 1937–38 but their rearmament programmes faced the difficulty of obtaining equipment ordered from Britain and a shortage of recruits. The British defence industry either blocked the attempts of Australia to acquire foreign aeroplanes or provided them with ones of secondary quality. Overall, according to Australian scholar David Day, in *The Great Betrayal*, the British and Dominion defence spending cutbacks in the 1920s and 1930s left both Britain and the Dominions in 1938 short of a modern and well equipped navy.<sup>40</sup>

Though he disapproved of the actions of Nazi Germany, Neville Chamberlain recognized that Britain was in no position to remove Hitler or change the agreement reached at Versailles. To maintain peace above everything else Chamberlain chose to follow an active policy of appeasement towards Germany. Following the resignation of Anthony Eden in February 1938, Chamberlain tried a new tactic as Anglo-German relations became more difficult. Vansittart pressed for hard bargaining tactics with Hitler, but Chamberlain knew that to deny Germany the opportunity to live as a satisfied nation would have had serious consequences for the British Empire.<sup>41</sup> Winston Churchill was pushing for an alliance with Soviet Russia; however, at the time it was not a practical solution. The British could not ally themselves blindly with Russia, a country, which in the political arena, was not likely to be a reliable partner. More importantly, Poland and Romania refused to allow passage of Russian troops; therefore, Russia could not help Czechoslovakia directly.<sup>42</sup> Balanced against this is the fact that the Dominions did not support British attempts at an Anglo-Soviet alliance. The Dominions and even India refused to consider going to war over Czechoslovakia. Since the principles of the League had not been applied rigidly in the past, there was not much hope in making a direct appeal to the League and the United States had no intention of getting into a war. Furthermore, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa were not signatories to the 1925 Locarno Treaties, which were created in the hope of guaranteeing international peace.

When Hitler was ready to invade Czechoslovakia in September 1938, on the Tory benches sat several dissidents, such as Winston Churchill, Anthony Eden, Leo Amery and Harold Macmillan, who objected to the foreign policy of Chamberlain’s Ministry; however, they had no power to influence their contemporaries to rise against Chamberlain in their opposition to conciliating

the dictators.<sup>43</sup> More to the point, they had no sound alternative plan. When Mackenzie King heard of the difficulties Chamberlain encountered in government, he was critical of the Conservative Party and the Labour Party for 'fighting the Government at every turn'.<sup>44</sup> In any event, after the Runciman Mission of August 1938 failed to negotiate a settlement between Germany and Czechoslovakia, Chamberlain made three trips to Germany to meet with Adolf Hitler on 15, 22 and 29 September. During the Anglo-French discussions of 18 September 1938, it was made evident that France, at the time, lacked the ability to fight beyond the Maginot Line. Consequently, the Prime Minister of France, Édouard Daladier encouraged Chamberlain to return to Germany. In his words, the attempt '*d'établir en contact personnel et direct*' might help to reach an amicable solution to the problem of Germany and Czechoslovakia.<sup>45</sup>

Despite opposition in Cabinet from Duff Cooper, First Lord of the Admiralty, Chamberlain could not accept Britain having to go to war 'because of a quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom we know nothing'.<sup>46</sup> Following his second trip to Germany, Chamberlain prepared the British people for the worst and ordered trenches to be dug in the parks of London, gas-masks to be distributed and the British Fleet to be mobilized.<sup>47</sup> On 26 September a *communiqué* issued from 10 Downing Street stated that 'in general effect, in certain eventualities in the event of war, we, with France and Russia, would go to war with Germany'—Moscow alerted its citizens to prepare for battle.<sup>48</sup> By now, the British Cabinet was in a state of anxiety. If France had to fulfil its treaty obligations to the Czechs, Britain would be drawn into the confrontation. Yet, British defence forces were hardly ready to engage in such a struggle. On the same day the Australian Premier, Joseph Lyons, informed the British Government that the Czechoslovakian Government 'should immediately make a public announcement of the most liberal concessions which it could offer ...'.<sup>49</sup> To avoid a debate on the question of conscription between the English and French-Canadians, Canada refrained from making any formal statements.

It was a difficult decision to cede the Sudetenland to Germany. Despite the critics, the Munich settlement of 30 September signed by Chamberlain, Hitler, Mussolini and Daladier was greeted with relief throughout the country, by all the Dominions, even by some of the dissenters, though divided in their response. The Dominions and King George VI sent messages of congratulations on the signing of the Munich Agreement.<sup>50</sup> Premier Lyons of Australia was convinced that the line Chamberlain took was the only one that held 'the slightest prospect of avoiding a war'.<sup>51</sup> Throughout the crisis the Canadian Prime Minister stood behind the 'striking and noble action' of Chamberlain. On the day of the signing of the Munich Agreement Mackenzie King sent a

published message to Chamberlain: 'The heart of Canada is rejoicing tonight at the success which has crowned your unremitting efforts for peace.'<sup>52</sup> When the British Parliament met on 3 October, Chamberlain was greeted by a standing ovation. However, the Tory dissenters who made up the Churchill group, the Eden group and the Amery group remained seated. In the end, their plan to cause a revolt failed mainly because 'the great bulk of the party' remained loyal to Chamberlain.<sup>53</sup> The more cautious and older Tory dissenters, like Leo Amery, did not want to risk a snap general election. Harold Macmillan told Hugh Dalton that '...those who voted against the Government, would be marked down for destruction', especially since Chamberlain, 'as Saviour of Peace, would sweep the country'.<sup>54</sup> Clearly, Churchill did not have enough support at this time to present an alternative ministry.<sup>55</sup>

At Munich, Chamberlain had reached a temporary *détente* but after that Britain's relations with Germany worsened. Six months after the Munich Pact Hitler without consulting the other signatories, completed the partition of Czechoslovakia leaving the British exasperated beyond endurance. The Germans might have thought that the Anglo-French concessions were an act of 'weakness and irresolution',<sup>56</sup> and that the 1925 Locarno Treaties were dead in the water, but the British did not. After March 1939 the British took a strong stand and would not negotiate with Germany until Germany restored an independent Czechoslovakia. Neville Chamberlain held the conviction that peace could be gained by co-operation and the ruling out of war by common consent.

The policy of appeasement was not the brain-child of Neville Chamberlain. During the inter-war period British leaders approached foreign affairs with emphasis on conciliation.<sup>57</sup> Between 1933 and 1937 when Ramsay MacDonald (1933–35) and Stanley Baldwin (1935–37) were Prime Ministers they did little about German rearmament, despite British intelligence warnings. In 1936, Baldwin stood by and watched as Mussolini and Hitler ignored the Non-Intervention Pact by giving military aid to the fascists in the Spanish Civil War. The British had a bad conscience about the plundering of Germany after the previous war. In 1938, Britain was not prepared to wage a war on three fronts: in the Far East, the Mediterranean and in Europe.<sup>58</sup> In the words of Wm. Roger Louis, 'the British military structure was very much an Imperial force designed to defend the Empire'<sup>59</sup> Overall, British foreign policy in the 1930s focused on protecting British interests and avoiding entanglements in European affairs. Foremost, the policy of appeasement was an integral part of British diplomatic and political policy. According to Stephen Rock, prior to Munich, appeasement was viewed as being "constructive, positive and honourable".<sup>60</sup>

Unfortunately, Chamberlain became Prime Minister of Britain at a time when the world was in chaos. Taking into account the anti-war mood of the country, the American traditional policy of isolationism,<sup>61</sup> the inadequate defences of Britain and France and the Dominions unwillingness to send an expeditionary force overseas, Chamberlain saw no reason not to attempt to find a solution to the legitimate grievances of Germany. If the British Government had gone to war in 1938, it would have had a difficult time trying to preserve imperial unity whilst fighting the Germans at the same time.<sup>62</sup>

The Dominions did not consider the issues dividing the Czechs and Germans were worth another catastrophe of 1914–18. Wanting to be free of entanglements in Europe they recommended that Chamberlain take a firm hand with Czechoslovakian President Edvard Beneš.<sup>63</sup> The Dominion High Commissioners in London supported the appeasement of Hitler and during the September crisis, Vincent Massey of Canada, Stanley Bruce of Australia, C.W. te Water of South Africa (the New Zealand High Commissioner was at Geneva) were ‘unanimously opposed to Britain’s and their entry into a war on the [Sudeten] issue’.<sup>64</sup> Even J.W. Dulanty, Irish High Commissioner to Britain declared that ‘it would be a very serious step to go to war for something which would appear an issue of detail more than of principle’.<sup>65</sup> New Zealand was more apprehensive over the rising cost of butter in their country than over the Czechoslovakian question.<sup>66</sup> The more nationalist Dominions, Canada and South Africa, were determined not to lunge into the horrors of war over a European territorial dispute. The South African Premier, J.B.M. Hertzog and his Deputy Prime Minister, Jan C. Smuts, held the view that in the event of war South Africa’s position would be one of non-belligerency.<sup>67</sup> The Dominions, despite Hitler’s disregard of the Munich declaration, continued to express the hope that war would be averted. Their confidence in Chamberlain had not shaken. In August 1939, Australia insisted that Britain encourage Poland to negotiate with Germany. The Dominions eventually accepted the possibility that they would be at war if Britain was at war and took a stronger position on rearmament. Mackenzie King was a passionate proponent of peace and his stand on imperial commitments was uncompromising, but he always believed that ‘If England is at war, we are at war ...’.<sup>68</sup>

In conclusion, Chamberlain certainly revealed himself as overly optimistic on his return from Munich when he said ‘Peace in Our Time’, but his mistake was not presenting the deteriorating and complex political European situation to the British public prior to the September crisis. Nonetheless, Neville Chamberlain held the conviction that peace was not gained by arms and tanks, but by co-operation and the ruling out of war by common consent. It was a

similar belief held by others that led to the founding of the League of Nations and the World Court. Chamberlain made every effort to avoid an unnecessary conflict; this ensured the support of the Dominions when Britain declared war in September 1939.

## Endnotes

- <sup>1</sup> Ritchie Owendale, op. cit., *Appeasement and the English Speaking World: Britain, the United States, the Dominions, and the Policy of Appeasement* (Cardiff, 1975), p. 11.
- <sup>2</sup> Joe Garner, *The Commonwealth Office, 1925-68* (London, 1978), p. 48.
- <sup>3</sup> The National Archives (TNA) PREM 4 44/4 Imperial 72 (1940), 11 May 1940 & PREM 4 44/9 Imperial 72 (1944), Chancellor of the Exchequer, K[ingsley] W[ood] to War Cabinet, 7 January 1942.
- <sup>4</sup> *Documents Diplomatiques Français 1932–1939* (DDF), 2<sup>e</sup> Série, Tome XI (Paris, 1977) Note juridique 196, 17 septembre 1938, p. 295.
- <sup>5</sup> W.N. Sloane, 'The Paradox of Unity: Winston Churchill, Mackenzie King and Anglo-Canadian Relations, 1940–45' (University of East Anglia, PhD: 2007), Chapter V.
- <sup>6</sup> Owendale, *Appeasement*; R.A.C. Parker, *Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second War* (London, 1995); John Charmley, *Chamberlain and the Lost Peace* (London, 1989).
- <sup>7</sup> New Zealand Institute of International Affairs Policy (NZIIA), *Contemporary New Zealand: A Survey of Domestic and Foreign Policy* (Wellington, 1938), p. 139.
- <sup>8</sup> W.N. Sloane, *Neville Chamberlain, Mackenzie King and the Pursuit of an United Imperial Policy Toward Nazi Germany*. (University of Birmingham, MPhil: 2002).
- <sup>9</sup> Documents on Australian Foreign Policy 1937–49, (DAFP) Vol. I No. 192, Cablegram unnumbered, Menzies to Chamberlain, 4 September 1939, p. 230.
- <sup>10</sup> Wm. R. Louis, *The Twentieth Century IV, The Oxford History of the British Empire* (Oxford, 1999; J.M. Brown and Wm R. Louis, eds.). At the end of the twentieth century the Commonwealth had 'over fifty states' as members, p. xi.
- <sup>11</sup> TNA DO 117/106/D 4539, Memorandum, Dixon and Harding, 7 March 1928. Note: the memorandum was dated 24 October 1927.
- <sup>12</sup> Documents on British Foreign Policy (DBFP) Vol. XIX, Doc. 363fn, Minute by Sir O. Sargent, 2 December 1937, p. 638.

- <sup>13</sup> *The Times*, 3 June 1933.
- <sup>14</sup> Sloane, 'Neville Chamberlain, Mackenzie King', p. 3.
- <sup>15</sup> *Imperial Conference 1937, Summary of Proceedings* (Ottawa, 1937), p. 8.
- <sup>16</sup> TNA DO CAB 32/130 (1937) contains the complete discussion on foreign policy. Also, see: The Library and Archives of Canada, (LAC) King Diary, 302 T112 25 May 1937.
- <sup>17</sup> TNA DO 127/28, Canadian High Commissioner to Secretary for the Dominions, 16 May 1938, pp. 10–2; TNA PREM 1/239, Canadian Government to British Government, 28 June 1938, pp. 5–7, 13; DAFP No. 35 Minutes of Meetings: Defence Questions, 1 June 1937, pp. 101–03.
- <sup>18</sup> R. Cuff and J.L. Granatstein, *Canadian-American Relations in wartime from the Great War to the Cold War* (Toronto, 1978; 2<sup>nd</sup> ed.), pp. 90, 95.
- <sup>19</sup> Earl of Avon, (A. Eden), *The Reckoning; The Eden Memoirs* (London, 1965), p. 70.
- <sup>20</sup> Nicholas Mansergh. *Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs: Problems of External Policy. 1931–1939* (London, 1952), p. 83.
- <sup>21</sup> Mansergh. *Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs*, p. 83.
- <sup>22</sup> Documents on Canadian External Relations VI, 1936-1939 (DEA) (Ottawa: 1972; John A. Munro, ed.), Memorandum, Defence Question: «Imperial Defence» Doc. 142, p. 192.
- <sup>23</sup> *Imperial Conference 1937*, p. 65.
- <sup>24</sup> DAFP I, No. 34 E(PD) (37) 10, Extract, Minutes of Meeting: Imperial Conference [1937]: Defence Question, 1 June 1937, p. 99.
- <sup>25</sup> Sloane, 'Neville Chamberlain, Mackenzie King'.
- <sup>26</sup> King Diary, 8 June 1937.
- <sup>27</sup> *Ibid*, 10–11 June 1937.
- <sup>28</sup> *Ibid*.
- <sup>29</sup> C.P. Stacey, *Canada and The Age of Conflict: A History of Canadian External Policies II 1921–1948* (Toronto, 1992), p. 209.
- <sup>30</sup> Documents on German Foreign Policy (DGFP) Series C (1933-1937), Vol. VI #277, (London, 1983), The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Führer and Chancellor, and the Foreign Minister, 18 May 1937.
- <sup>31</sup> LAC King Papers, Memorandum re interview with Herr Hitler, Berlin, 29 June 1937. *ibid*, 10 July 1937 CBC broadcast, 19 July 1937.
- <sup>32</sup> *Imperial Conference 1937*, p. 13.
- <sup>33</sup> *Ibid*, p. 21.
- <sup>34</sup> For a discussion of the treaties, see: DBFP Series A Vol. III, Doc. 435, No.179 L.N. Telegraph (W 6640/61/98), Mr. London (Geneva) to Sir A.

- Chamberlain, 13 July 1927; W. N. Medlicott, *British Foreign Policy since Versailles 1919–1963* (London, 1968), pp. 1–5, 58–62 & 74–7.
- <sup>35</sup> Stacey, *The Age of Conflict II*, p. 214.
- <sup>36</sup> Winston Churchill. *The Second World War: The Gathering Storm* (Boston, 1948), p. 10.
- <sup>37</sup> Frank McDonough, *Neville Chamberlain, Appeasement and the British road to war* (Manchester, 1998), p. 46.
- <sup>38</sup> Hansard, *House of Commons Debates*, Vol. 331, 7 March 1938 col. 1558.
- <sup>39</sup> R. Macleod, (Col.) and D. Kelly (eds.), *Time Unguarded: The Ironside Diaries 1937–1940*. (New York, 1962), p. 43.
- <sup>40</sup> David Day. *The Great Betrayal: Britain, Australia & the Onset of the Pacific War, 1939–42*. (New York, 1988), pp.11, 14–5.
- <sup>41</sup> Macleod and Kelly (eds.), *Ironside Diaries*, p. 59.
- <sup>42</sup> DDF, 2<sup>e</sup> Série, Tome XI, Note juridique 196, 17 septembre 1938, pp. 294–95.
- <sup>43</sup> Graham Stewart. *Burying Caesar: Churchill, Chamberlain and the Battle for the Tory Party* (London, 1999), pp. 371–2.
- <sup>44</sup> King Diary, 1000/4 T139, 10 September 1939; NC 7/3/29, letter from King George VI to NC, 16 September 1938.
- <sup>45</sup> DDF, 2<sup>e</sup> Série, Tome XI, 212, Compte rendu des conversations franco-britannique du 18 septembre 1938, 333; DDF, 2<sup>e</sup> Série, Tome XI, 421 T no 5 1057 à 1059, M. de Saint Quentin (French Ambassador at Washington) Note du Directeur Politique, p. 581.
- <sup>46</sup> Medlicott, *British Foreign Policy since Versailles*, p. 338.
- <sup>47</sup> Stacey. *The Age of Conflict II*. p. 214.
- <sup>48</sup> DDF, 2<sup>e</sup> Série, Tome XI, 492, M. Corbin (Ambassador of France to London) à Georges Bonnett (Minister of Foreign Affairs), p. 546.
- <sup>49</sup> Garner, op. cit., *The Commonwealth Office*, p. 89.
- <sup>50</sup> DAFP I, No. 294 & 295, (cablegrams unnumbered), Lyons to Chamberlain, 30 September 1938, pp. 476, 478.
- <sup>51</sup> DAFP I, No. 304, Bruce to Lyons, Summary report of reaction in London on his return from Munich, 7 October 1938, 497, pp. 484–97.
- <sup>52</sup> King Diary, 14 September 1938; *The Globe and Mail*, 30 September 1938.
- <sup>53</sup> *Manchester Guardian*, 4 October 1934. For an appreciation of the difficulties that Chamberlain faced and his hopes for better relations with dictators see his letters to his sisters, Hilda and Ida: NC 18/1/1074, NC to Ida, 22 October 1938.
- <sup>54</sup> H. Dalton, *The Fateful Years* (London: 1957), pp. 198–99.
- <sup>55</sup> Garner, *The Commonwealth Office*, p. 375.

- <sup>56</sup> Stephen R. Rock, *Appeasement in International Politics*, (Lexington, 2000), p. 67.
- <sup>57</sup> Neville Thompson, *The Anti-Appeasers, Conservative Opposition to Appeasement* (London, 1971), p. 32.
- <sup>58</sup> Michael Howard, *The Continental Commitment: The Dilemma of British Defence Policy in the Era of the Two World Wars* (London, 1972).
- <sup>59</sup> Louis, *The Twentieth Century IV*, p. 24.
- <sup>60</sup> Rock, *Appeasement in International Politics*, p. 11.
- <sup>61</sup> Arnold A. Offner, *American Appeasement: the United States Foreign Policy and Germany 1933–1938* (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), pp. 34, 275.
- <sup>62</sup> Earl of Halifax, *Fulness of Days*. (London, 1957), pp. 197–8.
- <sup>63</sup> DAFP I, No 278, Lyons to Chamberlain, 26 September 1938; Also see: DAFP I, No. 285, Meetings: U.K. and Dominion Representatives 27 September 1938, p. 467 & DAFP I, No. 292, 29 September 1938, p. 473.
- <sup>64</sup> C. Sanger, *Malcolm MacDonald: Bringing an End to Empire* (Montreal, 1995), p. 140.
- <sup>65</sup> TNA DO 121/4(32), 23 September 1938; records of meetings between the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs and Dominion High Commissioners, 12, 23 & 24 September 1938.
- <sup>66</sup> NZIIA, *Contemporary New Zealand*, p. 182.
- <sup>67</sup> Vincent Massey, *What's Past is Prologue: The Memoirs of Right Honourable Vincent Massey* (Toronto, 1963) pp. 259–62.
- <sup>68</sup> Stacey, op. cit., *The Age of Conflict II*, p. 237.