

A Bridge Just Far Enough: Canada and the Transatlantic Link Today

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Abstract

This paper takes as its starting point the first theme for the YRN conference “New Foreign Policy Challenges and Canada-EU relations” and asks the question “What is the meaning of the transatlantic link today?” The purpose of the research is to counter the public misperception that Canada’s commitment at the international level declined in the post-Cold War era. Having argued that Canada’s role in NATO has been consistent and important, the paper will then discuss the meaning of the transatlantic link as it stands currently and as it might develop in the future, along with Canada’s role in that future.

Canada’s relations with NATO have always had a special character. Unlike the European countries, it was not directly threatened; unlike the United States, it could not be decisive in the common defense... (It) was beset by ambivalences which, while different from those of Europe, created their own complexities. It required both close economic relations with the United States and an occasional gesture of strident independence. Concretely, this meant that its need for American markets was in constant tension with its temptation to impose discriminatory economic measures; its instinct in favor of common defense conflicted with the temptation to stay above the battle as a kind of international arbiter. Convinced of the necessity of cooperation, impelled by domestic imperatives toward confrontation, Canadian leaders had a narrow margin for maneuver that they utilized with extraordinary skill.¹

Introduction

It is the aim of this paper to examine Canada’s engagements and commitments to European security. The hypothesis of this paper is that, contrary to the so called realist school of Canadian foreign policy, Canada was heavily engaged

politically, militarily, and diplomatically in European security both during and after the Cold War. Two arguments will be developed in the paper: (1) Canadian foreign and defence policy, despite budgetary cutbacks and troops withdrawals in 1993, has been consistently committed to European security since the end of the Cold War; (2) Canada has carried out the function of an intra-alliance 'bridge-builder', for example, by pushing for a collective normative framework of allied representation after 1989 and helping countries from Central and Eastern Europe to institutionalize these norms through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), the Partnership for Peace Program (PfP) and others. It is posited in this paper that by doing so, Canada has become a normative power of international affairs and as such shares eminent similarities with the European Union and its normative postures.

The accepted wisdom put forward by many academics and journalists of Canadian foreign policy (most prominently by Andrew Cohen) is that Canada's international security activities and commitments declined after the end of the Cold War. This argument is based on the idea that the fiscal constraints of the early 1990s brought about budgetary cuts in defence and foreign policy. As a result, Ottawa's diplomatic and defence services were under-staffed, over-tasked and under-funded. Hence, so the argument goes, the Canadian government found itself unable to send its best soldiers, diplomats and bureaucrats to serve in international institutions and missions. Consequently, the world turned away from Canada and Ottawa lost its influence.

Preliminary research, however, indicates that this picture is inaccurate. Canada became a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on the basis of a policy of two perspectives: an internal alliance one and an external one. The internal dimension refers to Canada's understanding of NATO as more than just an externally oriented security community. During the negotiations of the North Atlantic treaty, Canada insisted that the idea of economic cooperation be included. This eventually became Article 2. When the Cold War broke out, the external dimension of a security community took precedence over the internal perspective. The end of the Cold War worked as a switch in international security and allowed Canada to re-focus on NATO's internal security dimension. Canada became heavily involved in shaping the transition process of Central and Eastern European countries and promoting democratic values. It contributed to the foundation of legal and institutional arrangements, established systematic interactions with political elites, assisted in drafting defence legislation and norms for the conduct of civil-military relations, and guided the young democratic governments in restructuring their

defence and interior ministries. Canada helped in this transition process by socializing the political, military, and functional elites.

Thus, it can be argued that Canada was actually more engaged in Europe after the Cold War than it was during the bipolar confrontation. Politically and diplomatically Canada promoted the enlargement of the NATO alliance as well as its Partnership for Peace outreach Program (PfP). All these commitments are consistent with liberal internationalism.

The paper is guided by the following research questions: To what extent did Canada contribute to European security, peace and stability between 1991-2001? Why did Canada contribute? What are the underlying causes, factors, and interests and, if at all, how do they differ from the Cold War years? And what does this mean for Canada's role as a bridge-builder in the NATO alliance?

Canada has significantly shaped the development of political and military institutions in Central and Eastern Europe by promoting democratic values such as the rule of law, peaceful settlement of conflicts, multilateralism, and human rights. As such, Canada was involved in pushing for a collective and normative security framework of allied representation and thus is likely to play an important role in a post 9/11 international security environment.

Theoretical considerations

The liberal internationalist approach of Canadian foreign policy will be the theoretical focus of this research. In order to operationalize the hypothesis, a normative analysis will be used. Some NATO, NGO, and Canadian government documents and western newspapers are reviewed for evidence. The thesis uses a post-positivist approach to examine the discourse of the actors that are analyzed.²

Canada and the European bridge—The Cold War

Accepted wisdom in the international relations literature is that the terrorist attacks of September 11 changed the international environment and the nature of U.S. foreign policy.³ Before 9/11, North America was a “geostrategic backwater”⁴ for NATO. The defensive frontline of the ‘West’ was always on European soil - a result of the Second World War. After the war, the policy of containment and deterrence became NATO's core strategy and endured for more than four decades. Ottawa retained Canadian soldiers on European soil

until 1993, when a nation-wide budget crisis forced the closure of all its bases. Indeed, the operational tempo of deployments for Canadian forces operators rose and the government sent a significant number of troops to Bosnia and Kosovo.

Historically, Canada developed a bridge to the European continent. The bridge was reinforced by political, cultural, linguistic ties. This connection enabled policy makers access to Canada's most pre-eminent allies. The uniqueness of the bridge was that Canada built this bridge for itself: only Canada may traverse the bridge and shift 'emphasis' and commitments to either side of the bridge when necessary. The bridge provided Canada with options for the government and to avoid being pushed into a position where Ottawa would have to take sides between one of its major allies on either side of the Atlantic. Yet Canada's close relationship with some European countries (especially with Britain and France), when combined with her historical baggage, sometimes put Ottawa in an awkward position and occasionally required Canadian policy makers to take sides. The war in Iraq in 2003 was an example of this, whereby Canada, amongst other NATO countries, lobbied Washington to allow more time for weapons inspections but failed in the end. In other words, Canada's geographical location on the North American continent combined with her multilateralist aspirations, sometimes caused Ottawa to be torn politically between the United States and its other allies, particularly those in NATO. After September 11th Canadians, however, understood that Europe did not provide the 'home' any more and moved partly over the bridge back to the 'homeland'.⁵ The bridge was built by Canadians so that she would not fall between its transatlantic partners, the United States and Europe, and to retain manoeuvrability.⁶

The end of the Cold War: the NATO of Canada's dreams⁷

NATO's first post-Cold War step was the summit meeting in London.⁸ It recognized the substantial decrease of military confrontation and the requirement of the alliance to adapt to this new security environment. The Summit stated that, "NATO must become an institution where Europeans, Canadians, and Americans work together not only for the common defence, but to build new partnerships with all the nations of Europe."⁹ This was a call for Canadians to get involved and help build a transatlantic security community that would consist of more than a defence alliance and also include political and economic cooperation. Canada answered that call and helped bring NATO on course by exporting its values of democracy, freedom and the rule of law to CEE. These were interests—the desire for peace, prosperity, and democracy in

Europe—that Canada had pursued in NATO since 1949.¹⁰ It actively continued to pursue and foster those interests after 1989. Canada showed very strong support for NATO's future.¹¹ Canada's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lloyd Axworthy, argued:

As we review the lessons of history, I would like to recall the contributions of the former Canadian Prime Minister, Lester Pearson, who 50 years ago asked for Article 2 to be incorporated into the North Atlantic Treaty. The development of a broader identity for NATO is being reflected in our discussions on enlargement and in the enhanced relationship we are forging with Russia and Ukraine, as well as with the Baltic states.¹²

Canada recognized that Europe had entered a new era in which states of Central and Eastern Europe were gaining more independence from Soviet influence. Instead of relying on the concept of balance of power, Canada faced a new security environment and pushed for interlocking and interacting institutions. Extending the 'hand of friendship' to Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) was a German-Canadian initiative brought forward by Germany's Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher and Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark.¹³ Shortly after that the Berlin Wall came down, Germany re-unified and NATO engaged in the business of exporting democracy to CEE.

The Alliance has done much to bring about the new Europe... We need to keep standing together, to extend the long peace we have enjoyed these past four decades. Yet our Alliance must be even more an agent of change. It can help build the structures of a more united continent, supporting security and stability with the strength of our shared faith in democracy, the rights of the individual, and the peaceful resolution of disputes.¹⁴

At the summit in London, NATO leaders showed concern about the emerging 'security vacuum' the collapse of the USSR had left behind. This was fraught with complex religious, political, economic, and ethnic rivalries—for which they would prefer not to assume responsibility.¹⁵ NATO's answer to those security challenges was a new force structure. It moved away from the concept of forward defence and reduced its reliance on nuclear weapons.¹⁶ Also, NATO transformed its forces and increased their flexibility, adaptability and mobility. The Summit called for the creation of a multinational rapid reaction force capable of responding to crisis quickly.

The importance of Article 2 after 1989

It was the Canadian government in particular who lobbied its allies to include economic cooperation as one additional dimension of cooperation in the alliance.¹⁷ With Article 2 NATO members pledged to further reduce tensions amongst each other and actively increase an economic relationship. In short, the article was designed to increase the political relationship among NATO member states and to create something like a transatlantic economic alliance where countries from both continents would be subject to less tariffs and trade barriers.

Article 2, however, was overshadowed by the dramatic events in Korea in the 1950s. It marked a significant watershed for NATO and pushed the military dimension ahead by calling for the rearmament of some of its member states. Shortly after the Korean war, NATO began to reinforce its deployments in Europe, and Canada was a strong supporter of this NATO policy. NATO as much as the Canadian government believed that Eastern Europe would be a potential zone of invasion for Russian forces marching into Western Europe. Canada took up its responsibility and sent a brigade group to Germany.¹⁸

Subsequently, the political and the economic dimension of the NATO alliance never established itself as a significant element of the transatlantic relationship during the Cold War. Henceforth, the threat of a communist subversion into Western Europe was the 'glue' that held the alliance together. However, this 'glue' then disappeared after the end of the Cold War when the Russian threat vanished and Article 2 re-gained importance. Analysts remembered the 'Canadian article' and its relevance for the transatlantic relationship in 1949 and used the article in the new security environment to bring greater security, cooperation, and friendship to Central and Eastern Europe. Thus, it gave NATO a new objective to pursue in the post-Cold War era.

Canada, NATO's new strategic concept and the question of enlargement

NATO's transformation and the new strategic environment in Europe posed significant challenges for Canada. The disappearance of the threat of the Soviet Union, coupled with the emergence of a strengthened European community¹⁹ posed the fundamental question for Canadian foreign policy makers and Canadians at large of what priority and importance NATO should be given in Canada's foreign and defence policy. In other words, Ottawa was uncertain of how much resources it should devote to the defence of Europe in times of

reduced threat levels, especially when faced with the demand of the Canadian public to ‘cash in’ the peace dividend. The non-military component of the NATO alliance were always of concern for the Canadian foreign and policy elite and were certainly not new to them.

As a result of this historical importance of Article 2, Canada championed the transformation in Central and Eastern Europe as much as it favoured and fostered NATO’s outreach programs to CEE. The government advocated that NATO’s Western values and principles should be sent to Central and Eastern Europe. Canada sold NATO as an allied force for democracy and freedom in Europe and as a new security community being built. Prime Minister Mulroney endorsed this notion while speaking at the Convocation ceremony at Stanford University on 29 September 1991:

The burden of building a new world order is too great to be borne by any one country, even a country as powerful and principled as the United States of America; it’s a burden that must be shared by all industrialized nations, and I tell you today, Canada will fulfill every single one of its obligations.²⁰

Such an effort corresponded very well with Canada’s domestic demands. At the time, Canadians were reluctant to accept high military commitments to a peaceful continent. In this sense, Article 2 was seen as the means to achieve peaceful ends in Central and Eastern Europe. Also, cuts in Canada’s defence spending and troop withdrawals from Germany were consistent with NATO’s new strategic concept accepted at the summit in London.

This had the effect on Canada of reducing its defence burden to defend the European continent, and would allow Canada to shift its concentration towards peacekeeping operations as indicated by the government’s ‘new priorities’.²¹ Canada’s engagements with Central and Eastern Europe also found endorsement by the United States. In a speech made in Berlin, U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker argued that:

as Europe changes, the instruments for Western cooperation must adapt. Working together, we must design and gradually put into place a new architecture for a new era...the architecture should reflect that America’s security—politically, militarily, and economically—remains linked to Europe’s security. The United States and Canada share Europe’s neighbourhood.²²

NATO enlargement and Canada

When the Berlin Wall came down in 1989, Canada was as surprised by the changes to international affairs as were other countries. The Mulroney government, however, quickly realized the conflict potential of those historic events. Ottawa in particular, was concerned about the future and instability of Russia and its large military arsenal, particularly its stockpile of nuclear weapons. Canada's foreign and defence policy elite were also concerned about countries from the former Warsaw Pact who had gained a new independence. The strategic relevance for CEE being geographically located in between the old Soviet Union and Western Europe was not lost in Ottawa. The greatest danger for Canada was that Europe would re-nationalize its foreign and defence policies leading to renewed tensions and conflicts that could spread to the entire European continent.²³ This strategic threat continued to exist in the post-Cold war. Such a geopolitical setting would very much resemble the one existing before the First World War, where no common sets of rules, norms, and consultative mechanisms were in place to ensure international order.

Thus, two options were on the table for foreign policy makers in CEE: on the one hand, they could form a new 'buffer zone' between the 'West' and Russia. On the other, they could become integral members of the Western alliance. When the United States made the political decision to include them into the Western alliance,²⁴ Canada did not oppose and joined the decision. Indeed, Canada pushed for a far larger first round of enlargement and wanted to include Slovenia and Macedonia in the first round of enlargement as well.²⁵ Meanwhile, Canada confronted the Alliance with a demand at the 'enlargement summit' in Madrid that the first wave of enlargement would not be the last and, in fact, an open door policy would be upheld.²⁶ Ottawa also lobbied its allies to consult with Russia on the issue of enlargement and include her in the process through, for example, the Partnership for Peace agreement.

The changing meaning of Central Europe

This, however, resulted in a shift of 'meaning' of Central Europe. During the Cold War Germany was been seen as a Central European country. After the end of the Cold War, this perception shifted and now Poland, and the Czech Republic were considered Central European states. They were not only perceived by the international community as Central European states but also saw themselves as in the 'middle' of Europe between Russia and Western Europe. In this sense, these states function as a 'bridge' between East and West as well. Canada realized this very early and helped in the building and enforcing of this

bridge as it was concerned that the region would become a security nightmare if otherwise. The bridge also allowed Canada continued and transparent access to the defence planning of not only its European allies, but also those of its 'new' allies. In this way, Canada was able to retain a seat at the table and thus had first class access to pivotal information of security and defence issues pertaining to CEE. Canada realized the importance of a 'bridge-building' capability for Central and Eastern European countries and was probably one of the few countries in the NATO alliance to understand and appreciate the importance of such a function. Ottawa was able to do so because it had considerable experience with constructing and maintaining bridges at home. As such, Canada also gave NATO a new *raison d'être* and, despite the criticism at home,²⁷ Canada's NATO policy was consistent with official NATO policy.²⁸ NATO's new reason of state also had positive implications for the transatlantic relationship and Canada helped established its relevance.

Meanwhile, Canadian foreign policy makers were aware of the benefit of US commitment to an enlarged NATO because it would guarantee that the United States would not fall into an isolationist foreign policy. It also continued to uphold Lord Ismay's observation that the purpose of the alliance was to keep the Russians out, the Germans down, and the Americans in. It was apparent in the post Cold war that the Russians were weak. Germany had become a member of NATO in 1955 and so the only remaining goal, going back to Lord Ismay's strategic dictum of the early NATO, was to keep the Americans in. This was applicable and true in the early years of the Cold War as much as it was true in the mid 1990s. The danger was that NATO's strongest unit would depart from the alliance. And Canada helped bridge this objective in NATO at a time when there was great potential for the alliance to fall into irrelevance.

While Canada was trying to build a bridge to CEE, it also lobbied its allies in other international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to help develop a democratic society in Russia and other states of the former Warsaw Pact countries through various economic programs and loans. Canada helped export democracy, a free market economy, and the rule of law to Central and Eastern Europe, surrounding a slowly transforming Russia with democratic states in the hope that they would influence transitions in Russia. In this sense, Canada's promotion of democratic values to Central and Eastern Europe can be seen as a means to an end; the end being a more stable and less aggressive Russia.

Simultaneously, Canada was in favour of fostering the economic development within Russia and helped to integrate its economy into the globalized eco-

conomic community. The strategy behind those tactics was to foster economic engagement that would ultimately lead to an increased economic interdependence amongst former adversary. This credence in turn would make conflicts between the West and East more costly.²⁹ The assumption here is that a network of economic relations would also reduce nationalistic sentiments because each populous was assumed to be better off. Thereby, Canada contributed to a deprivation of Russian influence in Central and Eastern Europe by not only supporting the inclusion of countries into the Western alliance, but also by reducing Russia's economic influence and forward presence.

It was thus in Canada's national interest to have a more stable European continent, prosperous and free from aggression and hostility. This was also easy to 'sell' at home in times when Canadians wanted the government to cash in the peace dividend and reduce defence spending. Hence, the policy of enlargement was one of the cheaper options for Canadian foreign policy makers. For many Canadians the debate about NATO enlargement might be seen as largely irrelevant to their daily lives. The issues were far away from Canada and did not pose a direct threat to the Canadian homeland and therefore are of little relevance. Also, conflicts in the Balkans mandated primary attention of the public and the government. However, it can be argued that Canada indeed had a vital interest not only in the debate about NATO enlargement itself but also the process of enlargement. An enlarged NATO, in other words, is in Canada's national interest.

Motivations for Canada's support for enlargement

This is so, first and foremost, because Canada's major allies such as Britain, France, and Germany are in Europe. They are not only European Union member states but also share membership with Canada in the *Group of Eight* (G8). This group of states has significant leverage in the global economy and accounts for more than 65% of its activity. Also, Britain and France are two of the veto powers in the UN Security Council. NATO's allied councils also provide Canadians access to the world's most influential countries. The alliance also functioned as a forum for expressing its views and opinions. This makes her voice heard because unanimous voting is required in NATO. Membership in NATO is of particular importance for a small country like Canada because it is not a permanent member of the Security Council, and thus lacks permanent representation in the most prestigious council that decides on issues of war and peace. In sum, NATO functions as a diplomatic insurance for a middle power like Canada and as a 'bridge' to the continent. It is for this reason that Canada continues to have an interest in the stability and well being of Europe.

Second, an enlarged NATO would provide greater stability and security in Europe. This is a political objective of the alliance and is not novel; Canada supported it throughout the Cold War. This underlying strategic principle did not change after 1990. Canada's security remains closely tied to both NATO and the United States as the other country with which it shares the North American continent.³⁰ During the Cold War, the alliance assumed that politically weak and instable countries would be vulnerable to Soviet political, military, and psychological influence.³¹ The Marshall Plan, the Truman doctrine, and NATO were designed to build security and stability in Europe and to contain such expansionist moves. In short, the principle of collective defence goes hand in hand with the issue of internal stability.³² NATO continued to provide security insurance for its allies with its collective defence Article 5 in the post-1990 environment.

Since 1949 NATO also fostered another Canadian security interest. It prevented another global war that would bring large sacrifices to Canadians, as had occurred during the previous two world wars. The alliance has also provided Canada with a political forum, multilateral in nature, where it had a seat at the table at the most prestigious decision-making body after the Second World War. Canada has always seen NATO as more of a political organization and has perceived it as a community of states similar to those envisioned by Karl Deutsch.³³ Canada became a champion of Article 2 and an international actor because its governments knew that Canadian national security policy depended on a stable international environment and that its foreign policy priority was to shape that environment. It became a founding member of NATO, was the third largest power at the Bretton Woods system, the Organization of Economic Cooperation (OEEC), and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). In 1967 The Department of National Defence formulated the policy in this way:

International influence is not an end in itself, but a means of furthering Canada's national interests, both general and specific. The reasons for Canada's participation in NATO and North American defence are in this respect analogous to the reasons for Canada's participation in bodies such as the IMF, the GATT, and the International Agency for Atomic Energy.³⁴

Its membership in international institutions also allowed Canada greater political flexibility and a degree of independence from the United States that no other institution was able to provide. It not only provided access to Washington but also functioned as a 'counterbalance'. "Access to American leaders has

always been an important by-product of ‘paying one’s dues’ in NATO. Such access is critical if and when the world is moving towards major conventional warfare or possible nuclear exchange.”³⁵

Also, an enlarged alliance has geopolitical implications for Canada. On the one hand, an enlarged NATO would strengthen NATO’s overall military position in Europe. It would incorporate the militaries of its former adversaries and thus push NATO’s eastern border further closer to Russia. This had several implications and advantages for Canadian policy makers. On the one hand, it would ensure that the Russian threat would be deterred. It also reduced the likelihood of Canadian military deployments to Europe, and the level of readiness required of the Canadian forces. This, in return, saved money for Canadian taxpayers because the CF was not required to maintain forward defence installations and deployments to Europe to the extent it did during the Cold War. This Canadian strategic rationale was consistent with Lord Ismay’s reasoning for a NATO alliance of keeping the Russian’s out. Canada actively supported this long-term allied objective during the Cold War and continued to do so in the aftermath of it also. This is not to say that Canada was in favour of reaching out for cooperation to Russia through the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program and other initiatives.

An enlarged NATO supported the normative dimension and ambitions of the alliance of providing stability and prosperity in Central and Eastern Europe. The new states of NATO would function as a buffer zone against intrastate conflict and social unrest. This is a principle that Canada has supported through NATO’s history since 1949 through its emphasis upon and support for Article 2. As well, NATO was a military organization serving Canadian interests as much as it was an allied political forum. “Canada’s post-Cold War position is that NATO should be an instrument of stability and peacekeeping and should be adapted to suit the new prominence of these functions, while not forsaking the collective defence mission.”³⁶ The Canadian government recognized that the cold war NATO alliance had to evolve and for this reason Canada pushed its allies for an enlarged NATO. “To meet those challenges, Canada will press for an evolution in NATO’s vocation and membership, while seeking to allay current Russian concerns over NATO expansion.”³⁷ Also, Canada was in favour of NATO enlargement also because it saw it as an opportunity to establish a firmer political relationship with Central and Eastern European countries, while retaining access to NATO’s multilateral security information circle. Canada saw the difficulties and problems particularly with NATO’s inability of how Russia might perceive an enlarged NATO. At the same time,

Canada made clear that, "enlargement cannot be held hostage to negotiations with Russia."³⁸

Since the era of Prime Minister Trudeau and his third option policy, Canada also had a vital economic interest in Europe.³⁹ It reasoned that prosperous and economically healthy countries would also be less likely to go to war with one another. Here, NATO could play a role model and export its values of liberal market economies. The German foreign minister, Klaus Kinkel, put it succinctly by arguing that in addition to exporting security to Central and Eastern European states, NATO should also build an 'economic bridge' to those countries.⁴⁰ This was only in Canada's interest to gain access to an enlarged European market that would provide new opportunities for Canadian businesses.

Canada and the meaning of the transatlantic link today

Canada's commitment to Europe started to change after the end of the Cold War. The government's policy can be summarized as '*sowohl-als-auch*'⁴¹—pursuing its long-term interests in Europe as well as listening to its homeland security interests in North America.

The latter notion became visible when Canada's commitment decreased with the attacks on the World Trade Centre in 2001. Canada's neighbour, the United States shifted its attention back on the protection of the American homeland and on out-of-area operations in the global war on terror. For its part, Canada followed the U.S. and 'travelled' the bridge back to North America. The catalyst for this move were the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and an increasingly insecure United States. Canada quickly understood that the protection of the North American homeland was now the top priority of the U.S. administration and thus Canada's. Issues such as border security, immigration policies, and human trafficking were elevated to top levels of government priorities. Because of these developments, Europe did not provide the home any more and it was thus understandable that Canada moved away from Europe.

When the Bush administration placed a heightened emphasis on 'homeland security', Canada's national security objectives shifted also and re-emphasized Ottawa's commitment to greater continental defence in North America, as well as a closer military cooperation with the United States. In general, its foreign and defence policy moved away from NATO and European security issues. This trend towards greater emphasis on the North American continent started under Prime Minister Paul Martin. Shortly after his government was sworn into office, officials drafted Canada's first National Security Strat-

egy.⁴² It is the first time in Canadian history that a government attempted to streamline Canadian national security policy in a single coherent strategy. It highlights three objectives for Canadian security policy: (1) the requirement to protect Canadians at home and abroad; (2) ensuring the safety of the Canadian homeland; and (3) a commitment to international security. Accordingly, the importance of NATO in Canadian foreign and defence policy moved down the government's priority list. The objectives and visions outlined therein formed the basis for the publication of a new foreign and defence policy White paper, the International Policy Statement (IPS). It was released by the Government of Canada on April 19, 2005 and reiterates the importance of the defence of the Canadian homeland as the first priority of the military. Canada is America's closest ally and enjoys a large trading relationship with the U.S. Ottawa understood that the United States felt threatened and that Canada, as an ally and partner, was asked to ensure that it would not become a strategic liability to the United States.

Domestically, the government pledged nearly \$8 billion over five years to enhance internal security for Canadians and thus to North America. The money is spent to enhance Canada's intelligence capabilities, to improve cooperation among departments, to enhance border and marine security, and other measures. Further, the House of Commons passed the Anti-Terrorism and the Public Safety Act in prevention of future terrorist attacks and created a new federal department, Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness (PSEP). According to the government, the new acts are meant to "identify, prosecute, convict and punish terrorist groups."⁴³ It also gives law enforcements agencies new investigative tools. Parliament also revised the Immigration and Refugee Act in 2002 that facilitates the deportation of criminals from Canada. The Public Safety Act received Royal Assent on May 6, 2004.⁴⁴ Constituting the federal framework for public safety and protection, it enhances the government's ability to provide secure air travel by collecting passengers' information. The Act also enhances maritime security by requiring a 96 hours advance notice for cargo ships before these can enter Canadian waters.

The new department centralizes emergency preparedness, crisis management, crime prevention and border control capabilities. In addition, a new Canada Border Service Agency was separated from Revenue Canada as part of the Smart Border Initiative with the objective to ensure public and economic safety for Canadians. The border initiative was amplified and expanded upon in early 2003 by a 32-Point "Action Plan for Creating a Secure and Smart Border."⁴⁵ As part of this, integrated border, enforcement teams were created in twenty three strategic locations across the country. Those teams combined

U.S. and Canadian border services officers, provincial and municipal police officers, the RCMP and officers from other agencies. Their mandate is to obtain intelligence information and investigate potential threats to Canada. Also, the RCMP has dispatched officers to integrated market enforcement teams that investigate potential fraud. The point here is that the government understood the importance of the bilateral Canada-US partnership and realized that a porous border would make Americans feel unsafe. The fear among the Canadian foreign policy elite was that Washington would close the border any time it felt insecure about Canada. This, however, would have serious repercussions for the Canadian economy, and reminded Canada of the experience after 9/11 when the border was nearly closed down entirely for 72 hours. As a result, the Canadian economy lost nearly \$1 billion/day. Consequently, Canada was expected to play and pay a greater role in securing Canada's border through increased customs inspections, container scanning, and keeping databases about incoming flight passengers. It also developed the NEXUS program that allowed for an expedited movement of low risk travellers such as truckers.

Internationally, Canada contributed more than 7,000 troops to Operation Apollo between October 2001-2003. This commitment marked Canada's military contribution to the international campaign against terrorism in Afghanistan. Canadian soldiers also contributed to the stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan during Operation ATHENA, which is part of the NATO led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and pulled its forces out of the Balkans.

The Defence Policy Statement that accompanied the IPS clearly prepared Canadians for the enhanced roles of its forces in a new security environment. It broke with the myth of Canada as the peacekeeping nation and recognized that the time of traditional peacekeeping operations, where soldiers were interpositioned between belligerents, was over. Instead, Canadian soldiers must be trained and ready to engage in active operations, including unconventional warfare.⁴⁶ General Rick Hillier, Canada's new Chief of Defence Staff, made clear in a public lecture at Carleton University on Sept. 22, 2005 that "the job of the Canadian military is to kill people."⁴⁷ It was the first time a government official acknowledged the deployment of elements of Canada's Joint Task Force Two to Afghanistan, an elite and secretive commando unit. Hillier underlined Canada's involvement in active combat missions and the danger Canadian troops are facing in Afghanistan. Hillier, as well as the then Defence Minister Bill Graham, warned Canadians about possible casualties that might occur during active duty in Afghanistan.

As part of this continentalist foreign policy of Canada, the CF are currently undergoing a process of transformation in order to be better prepared for engaging in “three block war” operations. At home, a new joint ‘Canada Command’ replaces older command structures for operations within Canada. This new command cell is modelled after its U.S. counterpart, Northern Command (NORTHCOM), and ensures greater operational flexibility and jointness. It provides a unified and integrated chain of command in response to domestic emergency situations, such as terrorist attacks or environmental disasters. The new Canada Command also works more closely with civil authorities at all levels of government to prevent serious threats to Canadians. The hope among the senior leadership in the Department of National Defence is that this transformation will make the CF, “more relevant, responsive and effective.”⁴⁸

Internationally, Canada’s current engagement in Afghanistan is a forward defence strategy and can therefore be seen as an effort to make the Canadian homeland more secure. It also eases American concerns about Canada’s commitment to enhance the security of North America. Furthermore, sending Canadian troops to fight under a U.S. mission *Enduring Freedom* in Afghanistan means that the Government of Canada is taking side in the conflict and does not act as a neutral country like in peacekeeping missions. The point here is that what Canada does internationally matters in North America and matters for the bilateral Canada-U.S. relationship.

Secondly, the CF will enhance its ability to respond to international crisis situations much quicker and will be trained to move into operational theatres more effectively and better integrate its maritime, land, and ground forces. Agility and adaptability are the key concepts of the transformation process. A Standing Contingency Task Force that is capable of deploying to crisis situations world wide on a short notice is also in the planning process. The objective is to procure a rapid reaction capability.

Canada and ESDI

Furthermore, Canada’s reaction to devote more of its attention to the homeland was influenced by a quest for more autonomy of some European countries in NATO. The so called European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) is an initiative within the NATO alliance that allows the European Union greater autonomy inside the NATO alliance. Some analysts and practitioners such as NATO’s former Secretary General Lord Robertson see ESDI as advantageous for NATO, as it could contribute to a “stronger Europe, a stronger NATO, and a healthier, more balanced transatlantic relationship.”⁴⁹ Others, such as Henry

Kissinger warn that this new initiative could possible cause the “disruption of NATO procedures and impairment of allied co-operation.⁵⁰ The obvious question for Canada then arises, as the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, of “where do we fit in—if at all?”⁵¹ Another Senate report warned the government of the danger of Canada’s access to the European market in light of a closer European economic integration.⁵²

Even though the High Representative for Europe’s Foreign and Defence Policy, Javier Solana, assured NATO member states that Europe’s new capabilities do not provide collective defence for its members and thus does not compete with NATO structures, Europe’s new institutional structures⁵³ provide indicators that indeed the European Union is in the process of creating a greater autonomy for itself within NATO. In creating a military structure, responsive to the E.U. and capable of calling upon significant military power, the Union has achieved its aim of creating a mechanism to articulate and enforce an independent European security agenda. This development, however, also underlines a greater ‘Europeanization’ of NATO and European security in general. The implications for Canada are profound: a united and too capable EU might marginalize its “voice at the table” because Canada, by virtue of its geographical location in North America, only sits at the NATO table.⁵⁴

The second part of Ash’s *sowohl-als-auch* paradigm refers to Canada and its relationship and interest in Europe. After the United States, Canada’s relationship with Europe is the most important ally—Canada shares many important economic, cultural, security and political connections with Europe. It can be argued that by examining Canada’s international engagements that Canada’s normative positioning in international affairs might correspond to Europe as a normative actor. Thus, the EU and Canada share normative similarities that allow for a closer relationship between the two international security actors. Canada, like Europe share a normative understanding of multilateralism and an effective international system based on the rule of law. Ottawa and Brussels, for example, share a similar understanding of using military force only as the last resort after all avenues of negotiation and diplomacy were exhausted.⁵⁵ Similarly, both value sustainable development, respect for human rights, and peacekeeping as the guiding principles in international affairs.⁵⁶ They also actively collaborated in setting up the International Criminal Court, which was established in 2002.⁵⁷ Canada and the EU also a firm in their support for the WTO as the best rules based global trading system. Bill Graham, Canada’s minister of foreign affairs, said in 2002 that “the world we want is much like the Canada we want: a sustainable future of shared security and prosperity; of

tolerance and respect for diversity; of democracy and the realization of human rights; of opportunity and equal justice for all.”⁵⁸

Conclusion

The transatlantic link is still important and vital for Canada today. However, it has changed in scope and reach after 1989. I have argued that the ‘internal dimension’ of the transatlantic alliance has become more important. Canadian bridge-building was an important function for the alliance during the Cold War. By expanding the ‘bridge’ after the Cold War, Canada not only became more deeply involved in Europe, but also increased its significance and relevance in the transatlantic alliance.

The terrorist attacks on 9/11, however, marked a watershed for Canadian foreign and defence policy and required a significant shift. The foremost objective of Canadian foreign policy makers was trying to avoid becoming a strategic liability for the United States. All the developments that were implemented in Canadian public policy after 9/11 contributed to the sensation that Europe did not provide the ‘home’ for Canada any more. It also indicated to Canadian policy makers that Canada, as a non-E.U., NATO member, was not necessarily a primary stakeholder any more of exporting security to Europe. It showed a tendency that indeed, its foreign policy had become more continentalist. This is why Canada has to reinforce its transatlantic bridge.

Endnotes

- ¹ Henry Kissinger and Lawrence Summers (eds), *Renewing the Atlantic Partnership* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2004), 227.
- ² For a greater discussion of this see Ted Hopf, *Social Construction of International Politics: Identities & Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002).
- ³ Michael Cox, “American Power before and after 11 September: Dozy with Success?,” *International Affairs* 78, no. 2 (2002): 262. Stephen Walt argues that the terrorist attacks were a redefining moment that caused an enormous change in U.S. foreign policy. See Stephen Walt, “Beyond Bin Laden: Reshaping U.S. Foreign Policy,” *International Security* 26, no. 3 (Winter 2001/02).
- ⁴ Sokolsky, ‘Between Venus and Mars’, p. 6.

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- ⁵ See for example Canada, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World. Diplomacy* (Ottawa: Govt. of Canada, 2005).
- ⁶ Kissinger and (eds), *Renewing the Atlantic Partnership*, 227.
- ⁷ See David G. Haglund, "The NATO of Its Dreams? Canada and the Co-Operative Security Alliance," *International Journal* 52 (Summer 1997).
- ⁸ The Summit took place in London, U.K. on 5–6 July 1990.
- ⁹ London Declaration on A Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, London 5–6 July 1990, Article 4.
- ¹⁰ Kenneth J. Calder, "Doing the Things That Matter: Canada and Euro-Atlantic Security," *International Journal* 50 (2005): 702.
- ¹¹ Barbara McDougall et al., *Canada and NATO: The Forgotten Ally?* (Washington: Brassey's (US), 1992), 2.
- ¹² Statement by the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, The Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, to the North Atlantic Council, Special Ministerial Meeting, Brussels, 18 February, 1997.
- ¹³ McDougall et al., *Canada and NATO: The Forgotten Ally?* , 4.
- ¹⁴ London Declaration on A Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, London 5–6 July 1990.
- ¹⁵ Jeffrey Simon, "Europe's Past, Europe's Future: Does Eastern Europe Belong in NATO?," *Orbis* (Winter 1993): 21.
- ¹⁶ About 80% of NATO's stockpile of sub-strategic nuclear weapons will be destroyed.
- ¹⁷ Article 2 says: "The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them."
- ¹⁸ The majority of Canadian troops were based at Canadian Forces Base CFB Bad Soellingen in Germany. Sixty-two RCAF F-86 Sabre jets arrived in 3 squadrons at Baden on 4 September 1953. Several months after the RCAF units arrived, NATO HQ made the RCAF move to Baden permanently.
- ¹⁹ With the Maastricht Treaty of 1991 the European Community became the European Union (EU).

- ²⁰ Canada, Office of the Prime Minister, Notes for an address by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney on the occasion of the Centennial Anniversary Convocation, Stanford University, California, U.S.A., September 29, 1991.
- ²¹ See Department of National Defence Canada, "1994 Defence White Paper," (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1994).
- ²² See James A. Baker, "A New Europe, a New Atlanticism: Architecture for a New Era," Address to the Berlin Press Club, December 12, 1989, in U.S. Department of State, Current Polity, no. 1233 (December 1989)
- ²³ Andrej Karkoszka, "Canada, Poland, and NATO Enlargement," in *Canada, Poland and NATO Enlargement*, ed. Jim Hanson and Susan McNish (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1997), 2.
- ²⁴ Brent Scowcroft, "Whither the Atlantic Community" Issue Brief, (01–02), (Washington, DC: The Forum for International Policy, March 21, 2001).
- ²⁵ Statement by the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, The Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, to the North Atlantic Council, Special Ministerial Meeting, Brussels, 18 February, 1997.
- ²⁶ Statement by the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, The Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, to the North Atlantic Council, Special Ministerial Meeting, Brussels, 18 February, 1997.
- ²⁷ The criticism was probably most succinctly vocalized by Douglas L. Bland, *Campaigns for International Security : Canada's Defence Policy at the Turn of the Century* (Montreal: Published for the School of Policy Studies Queen's University by McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004), Andrew Cohen, *While Canada Slept: How We Lost Our Place in the World*, Trade paperback ed. (Toronto: M&S ;, 2004), J. L. Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military?*, 2nd ed. (Toronto: HarperPerennialCanada, 2004), Sean M. Maloney, *The Roots of Soft Power: The Trudeau Government, De-Natoization, and Denuclearization, 1967–1970, Martello Papers ; 27* (Kingston, Ont.: Centre for International Relations Queen's University, 2005).
- ²⁸ North Atlantic Council North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Final Ministerial Communique," (Turnberry, United Kingdom: 7-8 June, 1990).
- ²⁹ See for example Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, latest edition; Anne-Marie Slaughter, "The Real New World Order," *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 1997; Anne-Marie Slaughter, *A New World Order*, Princeton University Press, 2004. The theoretical model attached to this is the democratic peace theory.
- ³⁰ Gustav Schmidt, "Historical Traditions and the Inevitability of European Ties," in *Being and Becoming Canada*, ed. Charles F. Doran (The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1995), 84.

- ³¹ Allen G. Sens, "Saying Yes to Expansion: The Future of NATO and Canadian Interests in a Changing Alliance," *International Journal* 50 (Autumn 1994–1995): 679.
- ³² NATO's article II referred to cooperation in policy areas other than security. Canada had pushed its allies to include this article into the Washington Treaty because it always saw the NATO alliance not only as a military pact but one that would also foster economic cooperation. Nonetheless, after the end of the Cold War, NATO's values of political stability and security are still imminent and thus in Canada's national interest to contribute to them.
- ³³ Karl Wolfgang Deutsch, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957).
- ³⁴ Department of Defence Canada, "Rationale for Canadian Defence Forces," (Ottawa: July 1967).
- ³⁵ Douglas Alan Ross, "Canada and the Future of European Security: From a Cheap Ride to a Free Ride to No Ride at All?," *International Journal* 50 (Autumn 1995): 725.
- ³⁶ Sens, "Saying Yes to Expansion: The Future of NATO and Canadian Interests in a Changing Alliance," 697.
- ³⁷ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Government of Canada, *Canada in the World: Government Statement* (Ottawa: Govt. of Canada, 1995).
- ³⁸ Statement by the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, The Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, to the North Atlantic Council, Special Ministerial Meeting, Brussels, 18 February, 1997.
- ³⁹ Prime Minister Trudeau was concerned with American hegemonic influence in Canada and opted for a policy of diversification.
- ⁴⁰ Sens, "Saying Yes to Expansion: The Future of NATO and Canadian Interests in a Changing Alliance," 694.
- ⁴¹ It can be translated into 'as-well-as'. The term was used in the context of Germany's foreign policy after 1989 where Germany avoided making hard choices. Instead, it improved its relations with a wide range of states. This terminology was first used by Tomothy Garton Ash, "Germany's Choice," *Foreign Affairs* 73, no. 4 (July/August 2004). It was quoted in David G. Haglund, "NATO Expansion: Origins and Evolution of an Idea," in *Will NATO Go East?—the Debate over Enlarging the Atlantic Alliance*, ed. David G. Haglund (Kingston, Ont.: Centre for International Relations, Queen's University, 1996), 27.
- ⁴² Government of Canada, *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy* (Ottawa: Privy Council Office, 2004).

- ⁴³ Department of Justice Canada. *Highlights of Anti-Terrorism Act. Backgrounder* (Government of Canada, 2001). Available at http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/news/nr/2001/doc_27787.html (Accessed March 10, 2006).
- ⁴⁴ Government of Canada. *Public Safety act Receives Royal Assent*, News release No. GC 004/04, Available at <http://www.tc.gc.ca/mediaroom/releases/nat/2004/04-gc004ae.htm> (Accessed March 10, 2006).
- ⁴⁵ Joint Policy Declaration. *Canada and the United States, The Canada—US Smart Border Declaration, Action Plan for Creating a Secure and Smart Border*, December 12 2001 available at <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/anti-terrorism/actionplan-en.asp> (last visited March 1, 2006).
- ⁴⁶ Canada. Dept. of National Defence, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World. Defence* (Ottawa: Govt. of Canada, 2005), 8. For the myth about Canadian peacekeeping see Sean M. Maloney, *Are We Really Just Peacekeepers? The Perception Versus the Reality of Canadian Military Involvement in the Iraq War, Irpp Working Paper Series; No. 2003–02* (Montréal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 2003), Sean M. Maloney, *Canada and UN Peacekeeping: Cold War by Other Means, 1945–1970* (St. Catharines, Ont.: Vanwell Pub., 2002).
- ⁴⁷ For details of the speech see http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/1121433777212_154 or http://www.thestar.com/NASApp/cs/ContentServer?pagename=thestar/Layout/Article_PrintFriendly&c=Article&cid=1123278613449.
- ⁴⁹ Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, *The Transatlantic Link*, Brussels: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2000, 29.
- ⁵⁰ Henry Kissinger quoted in Toby Harnden, *Kissinger urges Bush to shore up*, *Electric Telegraph* issue 2071 26 January 2001
- ⁵¹ Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, *The New NATO and the Evolution of Peacekeeping: Implications for Canada* (Ottawa: Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Apr. 2000, 66.
- ⁵² See Parliament of Canada, Senate, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, “Europe Revisited: Consequences of increased European Integration for Canada”, available at <http://www.parl.gc.ca/36/2/parlbus/commbus/senate/Com-e/FORE-E/REP-E/rep04nov99part2-e.htm#C.%20EU%20Enlargement>, accessed 6 April 2007.
- ⁵³ Such as the Political and Security Committee, the Military Staff Committee, the E.U. military staff, as well as a European Rapid Reaction Force that were developed after the historical St. Malo meeting between President Chirac and Prime Minister Blair.

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- ⁵⁴ An indicator for this tendency is that Canada as a NATO member was not explicitly mentioned in the Helsinki communiqué of 1999, but non-NATO countries such as Russia or the Ukraine were.
- ⁵⁵ The EU Security Strategy as well as Canada's national security strategy make this point. See European Council, "A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy," (Brussels: European Council, 2003), Government of Canada, *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy*.
- ⁵⁶ See for example Jennifer M. Welsh, *Transatlantic Identity and International Action: Rapporteur's Report* (Kingston, Ont.: Published for the School of Policy Studies Queen's University by McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005), 9.
- ⁵⁷ The ICC is an independent, permanent court that tries persons accused of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Up until the date of this writing, the court had 104 members.
- ⁵⁸ Bill Graham, Speech to the International Press Freedom Awards, Toronto, 13 November 2002, quoted in Steve Lee, "Canadian Values in Canadian Foreign Policy," *Canadian Foreign Policy* 10:1 (Fall 2002), 1.